Monsanto Co. v. Durnell

[Argued April 27, 2026. Decided June 25, 2026. No. 24–1068 came to the Court on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District. Durnell sued in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis in 2019; a jury returned a failure-to-warn verdict for him, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, 707 S. W. 3d 828 (2025). The Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer on April 1, 2025. The disposition here: “707 S. W. 3d 828, reversed and remanded.”]

[The Reporter’s line-up, in full: “KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.” This is an opinion of the Court throughout — unlike Learning Resources and Gade*, there is no plurality portion. Note the split runs across the usual lines in both directions: Justices Sotomayor and Kagan are in the majority, Justice Gorsuch is in dissent. No numeral appears; seven and two is arithmetic.]*

[A note on citation. The running head reads “Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)” — the volume is assigned, the page is blank, and CourtListener carries no parallel S. Ct. or L. Ed. 2d cite. This reading carries no U.S. Reports pin cite to this case, and none has been guessed; where a pin is needed, use the slip opinion’s own pagination, remembering that each opinion below is separately paginated (Court 1–22, Thomas 1–4, Jackson 1–24). Cases the opinions cite are given as the opinions give them. Same convention as Learning Resources in Module 5 and Landor in Module 4.]

[What to watch for. First, the preposition. The whole case turns on §136v(b)‘s phrase “requirements … under this subchapter.” At slip op. 15 the Court says FIFRA “affords preemptive force to federal requirements imposed ‘under’ FIFRA, not merely those imposed ‘by’ the actual statute itself.” That is what lets EPA’s label approval — an agency act, not a statutory command — do the preempting. Ask whether the two words will bear the difference.

Second, what the Court does not do. It decides on express preemption alone and reserves implied preemption in footnote 7 — one sentence. So nothing here resolves impossibility preemption for pesticide labels. And the presumption against preemption is never mentioned by the majority: the phrase appears exactly once in all fifty-three pages, in the dissent, and even there only to describe what Bates did with it. Compare Rice*, which announced the assumption, and* Wyeth*, which made it a “cornerstone.”*

Third, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U. S. 431 (2005). Bates is not overruled — the word “overrule” and the phrase “stare decisis” appear nowhere in the case — and the majority leans on it for the proposition that state tort duties are labeling “requirements.” What the Court does is confine it: efficacy claims, which EPA does not review, are not preempted; safety claims, which it does, are. Justice Jackson’s answer is that Bates remanded for further proceedings, which it could not have done if label approval were itself a preempting requirement.

Fourth, Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U. S. 312 (2008), which the Court calls “dispositive here” at slip op. 13, and which the dissent says is the wrong analogy. Watch the two Justices argue about which precedent governs, rather than about what §136v(b) means.

Fifth, the circuit split — and how little of it appears. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a split and then addresses it in one “Compare … with” string cite at slip op. 8. The words “Third Circuit,” “Ninth Circuit” and “Eleventh Circuit” appear nowhere in the opinion. It does not adopt Schaffner*‘s reasoning; it reaches the same result by its own route.]*

[This reading is edited. The Court’s Part II, where the case is decided, is given entire. Omitted passages elsewhere are summarized in brackets, and footnotes outside Part II and Justice Thomas’s concurrence are omitted.]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under authority granted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Environmental Protection Agency regulates pesticides, including pesticide labels. As relevant here, EPA regulates Roundup, a glyphosate-based pesticide manufactured by Monsanto. Because EPA has repeatedly concluded that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer, the agency has not required a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Importantly, EPA’s regulations require a pesticide manufacturer such as Monsanto to use the EPA-approved pesticide label—here, the Roundup label without a cancer warning—unless and until EPA approves or requires a different label. Moreover, to ensure “[u]niformity” in labeling, FIFRA’s preemption clause prohibits States from imposing any pesticide labeling requirements that are “in addition to or different from” the federal labeling requirements “under” FIFRA. 7 U. S. C. §136v(b).

John Durnell brought a failure-to-warn tort suit in Missouri state court against Monsanto for not including a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Durnell alleged that Monsanto failed to warn him of Roundup’s cancer risks and that he developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma as a result.

But Durnell’s state tort claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to Roundup’s label even though federal law requires Monsanto to use the EPA-approved label without a cancer warning. Because Durnell’s state tort claim would impose a pesticide labeling requirement “in addition to or different from” the label required by EPA, FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s claim.

I

A

[Omitted: the history of FIFRA from 1947 to the 1972 amendments that “transformed” it into a comprehensive regulatory statute, and the registration process. Before registering a pesticide, EPA reviews data on its effects and the manufacturer’s proposed label, and must conclude that the pesticide “will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” and that the label contains the warnings needed to prevent misbranding.]

Importantly, after EPA has registered the pesticide and approved the label, the manufacturer is required to use that label. Subject to narrow exceptions not relevant here, the manufacturer may not change the label unless EPA subsequently approves a manufacturer’s proposed change or EPA itself requires a change to the label. See 40 CFR §§152.44(a), 156.70(c). If a manufacturer does not use the EPA-approved label, it may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. See 7 U. S. C. §§136j(a)(1)(E) (misbranding violation), 136l (civil and criminal penalties). In particular, EPA may bring enforcement actions against a manufacturer for violating FIFRA’s misbranding provisions—which could happen, for example, if a manufacturer sells its pesticide with a different label than the one EPA approved. If EPA determines that a given warning is necessary for a pesticide’s label and the manufacturer then proceeds to sell the pesticide without that warning, the manufacturer might face liability for misbranding.

[Omitted: EPA’s continuing authority after registration — its procedures for label amendments, its periodic review of registered pesticides, its power to cancel or suspend a registration, and the right of any person to petition EPA to act.]

Finally, and crucially for this case, FIFRA includes a preemption clause that further underscores EPA’s comprehensive and exclusive authority in registering pesticides and approving labels. In a provision entitled “Uniformity”—a title that was added in a public law enacted by Congress in 1988, not by the codifiers—FIFRA prohibits States from imposing “any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA. §136v(b); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, 102 Stat. 2654, 2687.2

[Footnote 2: States remain free to “regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide.” §136v(a). For example, a State could outright ban a pesticide within its borders.]

B

[Omitted: the history of EPA’s review of glyphosate. EPA first registered glyphosate-based pesticides and approved Roundup’s label, without a cancer warning, in 1974, and has since repeatedly concluded that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer in humans, including in reviews in 2017 and 2019 after the International Agency for Research on Cancer classified it as a probable carcinogen.]

All told, in accordance with EPA’s view that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer in humans, EPA has not required glyphosate-based pesticides like Roundup to include a cancer warning on their labels. Therefore, as a matter of federal law, Monsanto legally must use a label without a cancer warning unless and until EPA approves or requires a change.

C

In 2019, John Durnell sued Monsanto in Missouri state court. Durnell alleged that he had used Monsanto’s Roundup products for about 20 years and that they had caused his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, a form of cancer. As relevant here, Durnell brought a failure-to-warn tort claim, claiming that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. A jury agreed and awarded Durnell more than $1 million on the failure-to-warn theory.

In Missouri trial court, Monsanto moved on preemption grounds for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Monsanto argued that FIFRA expressly preempted Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim because FIFRA prohibits States from imposing labeling requirements that are “in addition to or different from” those imposed under FIFRA. 7 U. S. C. §136v(b). Monsanto explained that EPA approved its labels without a cancer warning at registration and that it was therefore able to (indeed, required to) keep using that label.

The Missouri trial court rejected Monsanto’s preemption argument. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. 707 S. W. 3d 828 (2025). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Missouri failure-to-warn claims are “fully consistent with” FIFRA’s misbranding provisions because “both require a pesticide manufacturer to adequately warn users of the potential dangers of using its product.” Id., at 832–833.

[Omitted: the division among federal courts of appeals and state courts on the question. The Court granted certiorari to resolve it. 607 U. S. 1148 (2026).]

II

FIFRA’s preemption clause is entitled “Uniformity” and provides that a “State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.” 7 U. S. C. §136v(b). FIFRA therefore preempts a state-law labeling requirement that differs from the federal labeling requirements imposed under FIFRA. “Uniformity” in labeling—the textually stated objective of FIFRA’s preemption clause—would otherwise be impossible to achieve. Ibid.

A

To start, as this Court’s precedents make clear and as the parties agree, state tort duties constitute state labeling requirements. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431, 443–444 (2005); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U. S. 312, 323–324 (2008); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 523–524 (1992) (plurality opinion); id., at 548–549 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Failure-to-warn claims, like Durnell’s claim here, “are premised on common-law rules that qualify” as labeling requirements because those “rules set a standard for a product’s labeling.” Bates, 544 U. S., at 446.

That makes good sense. After all, the heart of Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim under Missouri tort law is that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on its Roundup labels.

The question, then, is whether the Missouri failure-to-warn claim—which would require a cancer warning on the Roundup label—would impose a labeling requirement that is “in addition to or different from” federal labeling requirements imposed “under” FIFRA. The answer is yes.

As described at length above, to register a pesticide, EPA must approve the pesticide’s label. And to approve the label, EPA must determine that the label contains all warnings “necessary and … adequate to protect health and the environment” and that a label does not include any “false or misleading” statements. §§136a(c)(5)(B), 136(q)(1)(A), (G).

After EPA approves a pesticide’s label at registration, manufacturers are legally required to use that label— unless and until EPA approves or requires a label change and amends the pesticide’s registration. See §136a(f)(1); 40 CFR §§152.44(a), 156.70(c) (2025). If a manufacturer does not use the EPA-approved label, it may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. See 7 U. S. C. §§136l, 136j(a)(1)(E).

It is true that EPA may subsequently change course in light of new information or new analysis, and require an amended label and amended registration. As described above, FIFRA and EPA’s regulations set forth an extensive process for doing so. But absent such an EPA-approved or EPA-required label change, the pesticide manufacturers may—and indeed legally must—use the pesticide label approved by EPA at registration.5

[Footnote 5: Of course, a manufacturer may make “minor modifications” by notification to EPA and without EPA’s approval. 40 CFR §152.46(a)(1). But EPA’s regulations specifically require EPA approval for precautionary “statements pertaining to the hazards of the product,” which would include cancer warnings. §156.70(c); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 32–33 (“that exception” for minor modifications “does not apply to precautionary statements like cancer warnings”). The dissent disputes that conclusion, maintaining that precautionary statements encompass only “acute hazards,” not chronic risks—and thus do not require EPA approval for cancer warnings. Post, at 6, n. 4 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). The ordinary meaning of “hazards” and “precautionary statements,” however, covers cancer warnings. Hazards to human health are hazards. As the U. S. Government has explained, “precautionary statements” pertain to the hazards of a pesticide and thus plainly encompass “cancer warning[s].” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7 (quotation marks omitted); see Tr. Oral Arg. 55 (“[I]f you are doing something like a hazard warning, which I don’t see any way of describing a cancer warning as anything other than that, you must get agency approval. That’s what it says. That’s 156.70”); see also id., at 43 (“[Section] 156.70 is the clearest. It says, for hazards like cancer, you have to ask for EPA’s approval”). That is why EPA requires robust evidence of a pesticide’s potential carcinogenicity as a part of registration. See, e.g., 40 CFR §§158.34, 158.130(d)(3), 158.500(d) (2025). And that is why, with respect to Roundup specifically, EPA has repeatedly evaluated glyphosate’s potential carcinogenicity to ensure that the pesticide “will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects” on human health and the environment. 7 U. S. C. §136a(c)(5)(D); see supra, at 6–7. Moreover, even if Monsanto could unilaterally add a cancer warning to its Roundup label as a “minor modification,” EPA has not required such a warning. Therefore, a state-law requirement purporting to mandate a cancer warning is necessarily “in addition to” or “different from” the relevant federal requirements.]

In sum, federal law requires Monsanto to sell Roundup with the label that EPA approved at the initial registration and that EPA has subsequently re-approved on multiple occasions—that is, the label without a cancer warning. Durnell’s state tort claim, by contrast, would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to its labels. That Missouri-law requirement is “in addition to” and “different from” Monsanto’s federal-law labeling obligations.

B

This Court’s precedents reinforce that textual conclusion. In Bates, the Court explained that the relevant labeling “requirements” under FIFRA included FIFRA’s misbranding provision and “any relevant EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s misbranding standards.” 544 U. S., at 453.

And the Bates Court gave a telling example of how FIFRA’s preemption clause operates. If an EPA regulation required a “CAUTION” designation for a pesticide and if a state failure-to-warn claim targeted the pesticide’s label for including the “CAUTION” designation instead of a “DANGER” warning, that failure-to-warn claim would be preempted. See ibid.

Here, just like an EPA regulation providing that a pesticide need not include a “DANGER” warning on its label, EPA’s registration determination that Roundup’s label need not include a cancer warning constitutes a federal labeling requirement that cannot be altered by state law, including state tort suits. That is because those registration determinations, just like EPA’s regulations, “give content to FIFRA’s misbranding standards.” Ibid.

To be sure, in Bates, the state failure-to-warn claims at issue targeted a pesticide label’s efficacy claims. See id., at 435, 440. Those state tort claims were not preempted. Bates distinguished between efficacy claims on the one hand—which EPA did not review as a part of registration— and safety claims on the other hand, which EPA does thoroughly review at registration and are therefore preempted. See id., at 440 (“EPA’s approval of a pesticide label does not reflect any determination on the part of EPA that the pesticide will be efficacious”) (quotation marks omitted).

This case of course concerns safety claims. And when it comes to safety claims, EPA’s registration determinations do reflect EPA’s considered judgment that a pesticide’s label is not false or misleading and contains all necessary warnings. So safety claims that would impose labeling requirements “in addition to” or “different from” those required under FIFRA are preempted.

The Court’s more recent decision in Riegel further confirms that Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim is expressly preempted. In Riegel, the Court addressed the preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, which is nearly identical to FIFRA’s preemption clause. 552 U. S., at 316; see 21 U. S. C. §360k(a).6 The Medical Device Amendments direct the Food and Drug Administration to approve medical devices for sale after analyzing their safety, just as EPA does for pesticides. 552 U. S., at 318. As part of the premarket approval process, FDA is required to review the device’s label and to determine that the label is neither false nor misleading, as EPA does for pesticide labels. Ibid. And after FDA approves a device, the manufacturer is required to use that label and is prohibited from making any changes to the device or label without additional FDA approval, as is the case with pesticide labels and EPA. Id., at 319.

[Footnote 6: The MDA’s express preemption clause provides that “no State … may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.” 21 U. S. C. §360k(a) (emphasis added).]

The Riegel Court concluded that FDA’s premarket approval of devices imposed “ ‘requirements’ under” the Act’s preemption clause, id., at 322, and therefore that FDA’s premarket approval of a medical device preempted state-law claims premised on additional or contrary safety requirements. Id., at 323–325.

Riegel is dispositive here. If FDA’s premarket approval of medical devices preempted additional state-law requirements, so too must EPA’s registration of pesticides and approval of pesticide labels.

As Riegel indicates, allowing Durnell’s state tort claim to overcome preemption would affect more than FIFRA. The Medical Device Amendments and several other federal statutes across a range of industries contain similar or identical labeling preemption provisions. See, e.g., 21 U. S. C. §§678; 1052(b); 467e; 379s(a), 379r(a)(2); 343– 1(a)(2)–(4). Those similar labeling preemption clauses reflect Congress’s judgment that the ability to sell a product throughout the country with a single label can be important to maintaining an efficient nationwide market.

In short, under federal law, Monsanto was required (i) to obtain EPA’s approval for its Roundup label at registration; and (ii) to use the EPA-approved Roundup label unless, in the future, EPA approved or required changes to the label. Those are the relevant federal labeling requirements “under” FIFRA. Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim, meanwhile, would require Monsanto to place a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. That state labeling requirement is “in addition to or different from” EPA’s labeling determinations that do not mandate a cancer warning. Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim is expressly preempted.7

[Footnote 7: Because we conclude that Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim is expressly preempted, we need not consider Monsanto’s implied preemption argument.]

III

Durnell counters with four overlapping arguments, none of which is persuasive.

First, Durnell (echoed by the dissent) contends that a Missouri failure-to-warn claim, like FIFRA itself, simply requires manufacturers to include adequate warnings to protect human health, and not to include false or misleading statements. Compare Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S. W. 3d 749, 756 (Mo. 2011), with 7 U. S. C. §§136(q)(1)(A), (G), 136j(a)(1)(E). But that argument operates at far too high a level of generality and disregards the central and comprehensive role that EPA performs in making labeling determinations under FIFRA’s registration provisions. Looking at only FIFRA’s general standard for misbranding rather than the specific requirements imposed under federal law would nullify

FIFRA’s preemption clause and the uniformity that Congress sought for safety warnings on pesticide labels.

Durnell’s argument implausibly maintains that EPA’s registration and labeling determinations do not have preemptive force. But by its text, FIFRA affords preemptive force to federal requirements imposed “under” FIFRA, not merely those imposed “by” the actual statute itself. §136v(b). And FIFRA authorizes EPA to “prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of [FIFRA],” and requires EPA to make registration and labeling determinations. §§136w(a)(1), 136a(c)(5)(B). EPA’s regulations require manufacturers to use the label approved by EPA, or face potential civil or criminal penalties. See 40 CFR §§152.44(a), 156.70(c) (2025); 7 U. S. C. §§136j(a)(1)(E), 136l. So EPA’s registration determinations as to the appropriate level of warning on a pesticide’s label impose “requirements” “under” FIFRA.

Durnell’s argument also contravenes Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U. S. 312 (2008). There, as explained above, the Court held that FDA’s determinations in the premarket approval process imposed federal “ ‘requirements’ ” “under” the Medical Device Amendments and thereby displaced additional or different state-law requirements imposed through state tort suits. Id., at 322–323. There is no good argument for treating FDA’s premarket approval as “requirements” “under” the Medical Device Amendments, but not treating EPA’s regulations and registration determinations as requirements under FIFRA’s materially identical preemption clause.

[Omitted: Durnell’s second argument, that EPA’s registration and labeling regulations exceed its statutory authority. The Court rejects it: FIFRA authorizes EPA to “prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of” the Act, and expressly directs it to regulate labeling.]

Third, Durnell (also echoed by the dissent) seizes on one of FIFRA’s self-described “[m]iscellaneous” provisions, 7 U. S. C. §136a(f)(2), which provides that “[i]n no event shall registration … be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter,” but that registration is “prima facie” evidence of compliance with the registration provisions. Durnell argues that the fact of “registration” of a pesticide like Roundup could not serve as a defense to an EPA enforcement action for misbranding and therefore cannot serve as a defense in a state tort suit that parallels a federal misbranding action.

That argument would effectively erase FIFRA’s express preemption clause. And the argument fails for multiple independent reasons.

To begin, §136a(f)(2), by its text, does not apply to state tort suits. That provision simply clarifies that registration does not bar EPA enforcement actions against manufacturers for violating FIFRA.

[Omitted: the Court’s argument that EPA would be “highly doubtful” to bring a misbranding action against a manufacturer that used the label EPA approved.]

But Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim does not fault Monsanto for using a label different from the EPA-approved labeling. Durnell instead faults Monsanto for not using a label different from the EPA-approved label. But FIFRA’s preemption clause expressly preempts any state tort claim that would require a pesticide manufacturer to use a label “in addition to” or “different from” federal requirements imposed under FIFRA, which, as explained above, include the EPA-approved label.

And even more problematic for Durnell, EPA regulations promulgated under FIFRA require a manufacturer to use the EPA-approved label and prohibit the manufacturer from unilaterally changing the label without EPA’s approval. See 40 CFR §§152.44(a), 156.70(c). Indeed, if the manufacturer unilaterally changed the label, as Durnell says Monsanto should have done, the manufacturer would be flouting EPA’s regulations and exposing itself to potentially severe federal penalties. See 7 U. S. C. §§136j(a)(1)(E), 136l. So Durnell’s argument also triggers potential retroactivity and estoppel questions. The law is not ordinarily read to retroactively penalize persons for doing what the Government had required them to do. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244 (1994).

Not surprisingly, therefore, the United States explicitly represented at oral argument that EPA does not bring a misbranding action when the manufacturer was using an EPA-approved label. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44 (“EPA doesn’t go after people for … not changing your label even though EPA doesn’t let you … . We don’t bring that kind of enforcement action”). Instead, as described at length above, if new safety information comes to light, EPA may gather more information from the manufacturer; ask the manufacturer to change its label; pursue registration cancellation, suspension, or modification proceedings; or seek civil or criminal penalties if a manufacturer failed to inform EPA of important new safety-related information. See 7 U. S. C. §§136a(d), 136d, 136l; 40 CFR §152.170(e)(1); Tr. of Oral Arg. 51–52 (United States: “if EPA also thought that there was some sort of misbranding risk,” “as a practical matter, what happens is EPA gets information and might ask the manufacturer … can you please try to amend your registration and change it?”).

[Omitted: the Court’s answer to the hypothetical in which EPA someday did bring such an action.]

Last, Durnell’s §136a(f)(2) argument contravenes this Court’s decision in Riegel. In that case, FDA was statutorily authorized to withdraw premarket approval for a medical device based on “newly reported data or existing information.” 552 U. S., at 319. And FDA was obligated to withdraw approval if it “determine[d] that a device is unsafe or ineffective.” Id., at 319–320. But the possibility that FDA could withdraw its premarket approval based on new evidence or new analysis did not preclude this Court from concluding that FDA’s premarket approval imposed “requirements” on manufacturers that preempted state tort suits under the Medical Device Amendments’ materially identical preemption clause. Id., at 322–323.

[Omitted: the Court’s conclusion that the theoretical possibility of a misbranding action does not defeat preemption, and Durnell’s fourth argument in part.]

Fourth, and relatedly, Durnell raises concerns about the scenario in which new safety information arises after EPA’s initial registration determination and labeling approval.

As described at length above, however, Durnell’s policy concern about regulatory lag is amply addressed by the extensive processes that FIFRA and EPA’s implementing regulations have established to respond to new or evolving safety information. For example, manufacturers must apprise EPA of new information “regarding unreasonable adverse effects” of their pesticides. §136d(a)(2). That obligation is backed by civil and criminal penalties. §136l.

[Omitted: EPA’s tools for learning of new safety information, including its review of glyphosate after the IARC classification, and the right of third parties to petition EPA.]

As demonstrated by that comprehensive regulatory regime, EPA possesses a variety of tools to learn of and address new safety information. And as a matter of law, state tort law may not impose labeling requirements “in addition to” or “different from” federal requirements imposed under FIFRA.

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With respect to pesticide labels, FIFRA demands “[u]niformity” and expressly preempts state labeling requirements that are “in addition to” or “different from” federal labeling requirements. §136v(b). Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim would require a cancer warning on Roundup’s label—a requirement “in addition to” and “different from” the label required by EPA under FIFRA. FIFRA therefore expressly preempts Durnell’s claim. We reverse the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.

I agree with the Court’s interpretation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and its application of our preemption precedents. I therefore join its opinion in full. I write separately to call attention to some of the underlying constitutional infirmities in the Act.

First, the Act likely exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate “Commerce … among the several States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3. This power allows Congress to regulate “selling, buying, and bartering” across state lines. United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 585 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring). It does not allow Congress to regulate “agriculture” or “manufacturing,” activities entirely “separate” from “commerce.” Id., at 586.

The Act is a “comprehensive regulatory statute” that appears to regulate more than the Commerce Clause allows. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 991 (1984). As this Court has acknowledged, the Act “regulate[s] the use, as well as the sale” of pesticides and “regulate[s] pesticides produced and sold in … intrastate … commerce.” Id., at 991–992. The Act, among other things, requires pesticide manufacturers to register their pesticides with the Environmental Protection Agency, submit information about them, and use EPA-approved labels before selling the pesticides anywhere. Ante, at 2–4. A manufacturer that does not use the approved label may be subject to civil and criminal penalties, regardless of whether the goods are sold in interstate commerce. Ante, at 4. And, the Act goes even further, making it illegal for consumers to use registered pesticides in ways inconsistent with their label. 7 U. S. C. §§136j(a)(2)(G), 136l(b)(2). The Act thereby purports to regulate how an individual who owns pesticide products such as Roundup can use those products, even if he bought them at a locally owned store down the street, and even if he seeks to use them in his own backyard. Accordingly, the Act is likely unconstitutional in many applications.

Second, the Act raises questions about Congress’s ability to delegate core legislative power to the EPA. As the Court explains, ante, at 3, Congress granted the EPA the authority to issue regulations for carrying out the Act. §136w(a)(1). The EPA has thereby issued “extensive regulations … dictating what must appear on a pesticide’s label.” Ante, at 3. Through these label regulations, the EPA exercises immense power over private businesses and individuals. Violating certain regulations is a federal offense. §136j(a)(2)(S). The EPA thus appears to “make substantive rules … punishable with fines or imprisonment,” a core legislative power that cannot be delegated. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. 229, 318 (2026) (THOMAS, J., dissenting).*

[Footnote: Such delegations of broad regulatory authority often benefit large incumbent companies at the expense of smaller competitors and consumers. Incumbent companies “exercise considerable sway over agency rules,” S. Prakash, The Sky Will Not Fall, in The Administrative State Before the Supreme Court 293 (P. Wallison & J. Yoo eds. 2022), which they use to lobby for more “favorable regulations” that “protect the existing regulated firms from threats arising from new firms,” T. Sowell, Basic Economics: A Citizen’s Guide to the Economy 107–108 (2004). Those regulations often enable a “profitable alliance” between corporations and government, as the corporations look “for government to cartelize their industry after private efforts for cartels and monopoly ha[ve] failed.” M. Rothbard, The Progressive Era 318 (2017). This scheme is a perfect example. As the Court explains, EPA approval entails onerous registration requirements, imposing a formidable barrier to entry for any company that, unlike a worldwide chemical conglomerate, lacks the capacity to commission scientific safety and efficacy studies. See ante, at 2–6.]

Third, and relatedly, the Act raises questions about the extent to which federal agency action can preempt state law, a form of preemption taken for granted by the parties in this case. See Brief for Respondent 37, 39, 43, 49. The Supremacy Clause makes “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties … the supreme Law of the Land.” Art. VI, cl. 2. The Constitution, federal law, and treaties thus preempt any conflicting state law. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 584–588 (2009) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Administrative action appears difficult to fit under the Supremacy Clause. Agency action is not the Constitution. Nor is it a treaty. And, “Laws” are made by Congress and the President through bicameralism and presentment. See Art. I, §7, cl. 2. So, if “agency action qualifies as ‘supreme Law,’ ” then it arguably “violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.” D. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 267, 334 (2015). On the other hand, if agencies cannot make “Law” their actions seem to fall “beyond the Supremacy Clause’s purview” and cannot preempt state law. Ibid.

Of course, to the extent that federal agency action is treated with the force of law, regulated parties should likely not be compelled by state law to take contradictory actions. See Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 588 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (agreeing that valid federal regulations can preempt conflicting state laws). But, the difficulty illustrates the consequences of the modern administrative state and our mistaken separation-of-powers jurisprudence. If agencies were not exercising core legislative power, especially through schemes that exceed even Congress’s powers, there would be far less occasion to address conflicts between agency actions and state law that the Constitution’s Framers would not have envisioned.

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JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting.

In 2019, John Durnell brought a state-law failure-to-warn claim against Monsanto, an agrochemical company that manufactures and distributes a widely used pesticide called Roundup. Durnell claimed that he had developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, a type of blood cancer, due to his two-decade-long use of Roundup. Roundup’s label did not (and still does not) include any warning about the risk of developing cancer. Durnell thus sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, alleging that Roundup’s label lacked a necessary warning. After a 9-day trial, the jury agreed and awarded Durnell $1.25 million in compensatory damages.

Monsanto argues that 7 U. S. C. §136v(b)—a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—expressly preempts Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim. See ibid. (providing that state labeling “requirements” that are “in addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA are preempted). Today, the Court agrees. The majority emphasizes that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has consistently registered Roundup—a precondition to Monsanto’s ability to sell that product—and has thus approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning. Ante, at 6–7. According to the majority, the EPA’s registration decision and approval of Roundup’s label created a labeling “requirement” under FIFRA: namely, that Monsanto sell Roundup with the label exactly as the EPA approved it. Ante, at 10–11. Thus, the majority concludes, Durnell’s lawsuit added a labeling requirement that federal law did not require, triggering preemption per §136v(b). Ante, at 11.

In so holding, the Court departs from the near-unanimous view of the many state and federal courts that have rejected this preemption argument. In my view, the majority should have joined that chorus. Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim is not “in addition to or different from” FIFRA’s mandates; it is equivalent to FIFRA’s key labeling requirement—the misbranding prohibition. And Durnell’s claim does not conflict with any other FIFRA “requirement” for §136v(b) purposes because the EPA’s registration of a pesticide and approval of its label does not create a labeling requirement under FIFRA.

So, I respectfully dissent. In accepting Monsanto’s argument and holding that Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim is preempted, the Court misunderstands FIFRA’s requirements, misinterprets the scope of FIFRA’s preemption, and ultimately leaves Durnell without a remedy for the significant harms he has suffered.

I

Congress has the power to preempt state law. It can do so expressly through the text of a federal statute or impliedly. Regardless of the method, federal preemption is typically premised on a conflict between federal and state law. See Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. 453, 477 (2018). Under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, “federal law takes precedence” over conflicting state law “and [thus] the state law is preempted.” Murphy, 584 U. S., at 477.

Importantly, however, there is not always a complete conflict between a federal statute and state law, even if they address the same subject matter. That is, federal law does not necessarily box out all state regulation on a particular issue. Congress can and does enact statutory provisions that specifically define the preemptive scope of the federal law. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, 608 U. S. ___, – (2026) (slip op., at 2–3) (describing preemption provision that carves out state safety regulations); cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 517 (1992) (“Congress’ enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted”). And federal preemption provisions often permit parallel state laws—i.e., those that “merely duplicate federal requirements.” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431, 442, 453 (2005). When allowing state-law versions of a federal mandate, Congress displaces state law only “to the extent of th[e] difference” from federal law. Id., at 453. Thus, state law can still “provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal requirements.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 495 (1996).

FIFRA fits this mold. It is a federal statute that regulates the sale and use of pesticides, and among other things, requires that pesticides bear detailed labels providing consumers with information about how to use them and what risks they pose. FIFRA expressly limits States’ authority to regulate pesticide labels, but it does not eliminate that authority. Instead, FIFRA preempts only those state “requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from” the requirements under FIFRA. §136v(b). This means that state labeling requirements “equivalent to” FIFRA’s requirements are not preempted. Bates, 544 U. S., at 447. In other words, FIFRA’s preemption clause does not block state-law claims where the violation of state law is also a violation of FIFRA. Id., at 454.

II

To analyze the reach of FIFRA’s preemption provision, I begin, per usual, with the statute’s text. See Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. 582, 594 (2011). To repeat: §136v(b) provides that a “State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA. To distinguish the state laws this provision preempts from those that can continue unabated, one must, first, identify the “requirements” under FIFRA, and, second, determine whether the state law imposes requirements that are “in addition to or different from” (as opposed to the equivalent of ) those FIFRA requirements.

Here, the majority falters on both tasks. FIFRA’s labeling requirements are established by statute and regulation, and those requirements are no different than the labeling duties imposed by Missouri via its failure-to-warn tort. The state-law claim at issue reflects a parallel requirement that is fully consistent with FIFRA’s primary labeling duty—its misbranding prohibition—and makes no additional asks of those who are subject to it.

A

“A requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed.” Bates, 544 U. S., at 445. In interpretating FIFRA, this Court has previously held that the term “requirements” includes “positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations,” as well as “common-law duties.” Id., at 443. Thus, the “requirements” under FIFRA that can preempt state labeling requirements are those directives “set out in FIFRA and its implementing regulations.” Id., at 452.

FIFRA’s principal labeling requirement is its prohibition on selling or distributing “misbranded” pesticides. §136j(a)(1)(E). The statutory definition of “misbranded” is extensive, establishing many detailed supplementary labeling requirements. See §136(q). For example, a pesticide that contains a highly toxic substance but does not have the “skull and crossbones” and the word “ ‘poison’ ” on its label is misbranded. §136(q)(2)(D). So too is a pesticide that does not bear an ingredient statement. §136(q)(2)(A). And so is a pesticide that has “false or misleading” statements on its label. §136(q)(1)(A).

Another type of prohibited misbranding is relevant to today’s dispute: A pesticide is misbranded if “the label does not contain a warning or caution statement which may be necessary and … is adequate to protect health and the environment.” §136(q)(1)(G). Adequate warnings must, among other things, protect against “any unreasonable risk to [humans] or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.” §136(bb); see §136(x). Consequently—and this is important to remember—one requirement under FIFRA is that a pesticide’s label must contain “adequate” and “necessary” warnings. §136(q)(1)(G).

[Omitted: the dissent’s account of EPA’s regulations on precautionary statements, which it reads as the only regulations giving content to FIFRA’s warning requirement.]

B

All this has implications for the meaning of FIFRA’s preemption provision. The provision’s language establishes that when FIFRA itself or the EPA’s regulations require specific statements on a pesticide’s label—such as the skull and crossbones or a particular “signal word”—a state law that requires additional or different statements is preempted. But, absent such federal-law requirements, a state-law duty that simply parallels FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition is not preempted.

Suppose, for example, a State mandates that pesticides causing moderate skin irritation bear the word “WARNING.” That state law would be preempted by FIFRA because the EPA’s regulations require that the label for pesticides causing moderate skin irritation bear the signal word “CAUTION.” 40 CFR §§156.62, 156.64(a)(3). The State’s labeling requirement is different from (and indeed conflicts with) the EPA’s regulations. By contrast, if a State seeks to hold a manufacturer liable under state law for failing to label a pesticide with the same warning words that federal regulations require, application of the state law would not be preempted under 7 U. S. C. §136v(b). In that situation, the State is not requiring anything “in addition to or different from” FIFRA’s requirements.

[Omitted: a second example of a state law that would survive preemption because it parallels FIFRA.]

With that background, it is easy to see that Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim—which faults Monsanto for not including cancer warnings on the Roundup label—does not trigger preemption under FIFRA. Missouri’s failure-to-warn tort punishes the sale of unreasonably dangerous products, like pesticides, without “adequate warning of the danger.” Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S. W. 3d 749, 756 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). As the Missouri Court of Appeals explained, Durnell’s claim has the same “practical effect” as FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition: “[B]oth require a pesticide manufacturer to adequately warn users of the potential dangers of using its product.” 707 S. W. 3d 828, 833 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Durnell’s claim does not impose any labeling requirement that is “in addition to or different from” what FIFRA itself requires, §136v(b); instead, the standards prescribed by federal and state law are equivalent.

Why might a federal law that expressly seeks “[u]ni-formity” in labeling, §136v(b), leave room for parallel state tort suits like Durnell’s? As we have previously explained, “FIFRA contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over time.” Bates, 544 U. S., at 451. To that end, “tort suits can serve as a catalyst”—encouraging pesticide manufacturers to “keep abreast of all possible injuries stemming from use of their product” and to maintain labels with the necessary and adequate warnings. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Parallel state tort liability is an enforcement tool that can have a salutary information-forcing effect, and that, in turn, helps ensure the effectiveness of FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition.

III

The majority does not view FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition as the relevant federal “requirement” for preemption purposes. Instead, it ventures far beyond FIFRA and its regulations, purporting to identify the relevant labeling requirement in the EPA’s approval of Roundup’s label. Ante, at 10–11, 14. The argument goes like this: A manufacturer must register its pesticide with the EPA before selling or distributing it. §136a(a). As part of the registration process, the EPA reviews and approves the pesticide’s label, confirming that the label complies with FIFRA’s requirements. §136a(c)(5)(B). Furthermore, the EPA generally requires a manufacturer to get the agency’s approval before changing its product’s label. 40 CFR §152.44.

As the majority sees it, the EPA’s registration of a pesticide and approval of its label creates a federal requirement that the manufacturer use the label exactly as the EPA approved it. Ante, at 11. Here, the majority says, because the EPA approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning, state law cannot require Roundup’s label to include one. Ante, at 11, 14.

This theory has some intuitive appeal—federal approval should count for something, after all. But, in reality, the majority’s view is unmoored from the statute’s text and irreconcilable with our precedents.

A

1

Start with the text. In the same section of FIFRA that lays out the pesticide registration process, the statute contains a crucial caveat: “In no event shall registration of [a pesticide] be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under” FIFRA, 7 U. S. C. §136a(f)(2)—including misbranding, §136j(a)(1)(E). Rather, per the terms of the statute, registration is merely “prima facie evidence that the pesticide [and] its labeling … comply with the registration provisions of ” FIFRA. §136a(f)(2).

These two parts of §136a(f)(2) work in tandem. Registration is prima facie evidence that the pesticide’s label complies with FIFRA’s requirements, meaning that the EPA’s approval reflects the agency’s best judgment that the label satisfies FIFRA. See §136a(c)(5)(B). But prima facie evidence is not conclusive evidence. Thus, the statute clarifies that, in the face of a misbranding charge, the EPA’s registration is not a defense. This means that the EPA’s approval of a pesticide’s label cannot conclusively establish that the pesticide is not misbranded. The statute, in other words, does not treat as infallible the EPA’s judgment as to whether FIFRA’s misbranding provision has been violated. For that reason, a pesticide may be “registered but nevertheless misbranded.” Bates, 544 U. S., at 438.

This, in turn, must mean that the EPA’s (not infallible) approval of a pesticide’s label does not establish a “rule of law that must be obeyed” when it comes to the pesticide’s label. Id., at 445. Because the EPA’s registration decision is not conclusive of the label’s compliance with the statute, that registration decision itself cannot carry the force of law, much less capture the universe of requirements with which a manufacturer must comply to prevent its product from being misbranded in violation of FIFRA. To conclude otherwise would turn the registration decision from “prima facie evidence” of compliance with FIFRA into conclusive proof of such compliance. It defies logic to treat the EPA’s approval of a pesticide’s label as creating a legal requirement under FIFRA when that approved label may not comply with the law.

[Omitted: the dissent’s argument that the majority’s theory is internally inconsistent.]

In short, the EPA’s approval of the label cannot set a “requirement” for §136v(b) purposes. Instead, the requirements of FIFRA—the misbranding prohibition and the implementing regulations—dictate the contents of the label. This is so because §136a(f)(2) makes clear that FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition continues to apply to pesticides even after they have been registered. The upshot here is that, even though the EPA approved Roundup’s label, that label could still lack a necessary warning.

A real-world example illustrates the interplay between registration and misbranding. In 1999, the EPA approved a label for a Roundup product distributed by Monsanto that did not include any statements warning the user that the pesticide could leak. But the EPA itself soon determined that the approved label did not meet the requirements of FIFRA because, “[w]hen used in accordance with its label directions,” the pesticide could “leak or spray onto the user.” In re: The Monsanto Co., 2000 WL 1886918, *2 (EAB, Sept. 29, 2000). Accordingly, the EPA imposed civil penalties on Monsanto for “distributing or selling misbranded pesticides.” Ibid.

This example rebuts the majority’s claim that a registered pesticide can be misbranded only if the label contains information that was not on the label that the EPA approved or omits information that was. Ante, at 16–17. Far from creating a new requirement under FIFRA, the EPA’s approval of the label did not suffice to establish compliance with the statutory requirement that a pesticide not be misbranded, nor did it shield Monsanto from liability for

violating the misbranding requirement. And if a state-tort duty, akin to Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim, had likewise required Monsanto to include a leak warning on the label, the State’s requirement would have been identical to FIFRA’s and therefore would not have been preempted— regardless of the fact that the EPA had previously approved the label without that warning.

The continuing force of FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition, even after the EPA’s registration of a pesticide, thus re-solves today’s preemption dispute. Since FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition remains a requirement with which registered pesticides must comply, state-law duties that are equivalent to the misbranding prohibition add nothing new or different that would trigger preemption. If an additional warning is necessary to comply with FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition, then a state-law duty can require that warning, even if the EPA approved the label without it.

2

[Omitted: the dissent’s answers to the majority’s arguments about §136a(f)(2) — its placement among FIFRA’s “miscellaneous” provisions, its application to state tort suits, and whether a manufacturer can be penalized for using a label other than the one EPA approved.]

At the end of the day, then, the majority’s theory of ex-press preemption rests on a misinterpretation of FIFRA. The EPA’s approval of a pesticide’s label does not create a labeling requirement under FIFRA. Instead, FIFRA’s key labeling requirement—the statutory prohibition on misbranding—continues to apply to registered pesticides even though the EPA has approved their labels. State-law claims that parallel the misbranding prohibition are not preempted, even if the claim requires a warning that was absent from the EPA-approved label. The majority thinks it “implausibl[e]” that the “EPA’s registration and labeling determinations do not have preemptive force.” Ante, at 15. But, at bottom, the majority’s quibble is with the text of FIFRA’s misbranding requirement and preemption provision, not with Durnell’s claim.

B

Perhaps recognizing all this, Monsanto embraces a more extreme position: that a registered pesticide can never be misbranded. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10–11. That argument is easily disposed of because it cannot be squared with our decision in Bates, 544 U. S. 431, which recognized that a pesticide can be “registered but nevertheless misbranded,” id., at 438. Indeed, Bates—the only prior case in which we interpreted FIFRA’s preemption provision—not only requires flat rejection of this view; it also confirms that the majority’s interpretation of §136v(b) is wrong.

The plaintiffs in Bates brought state tort claims against Dow Agrosciences for failing to warn them that the use of its pesticide in a particular type of soil would stunt crop growth. Id., at 435. We held that States could impose label-based requirements that were equivalent to FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition. Id., at 452–453. And we remanded for the lower courts to decide in the first instance whether the particular failure-to-warn claim at issue in Bates imposed a requirement equivalent to FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition. Id., at 453–454.

That disposition is critical. Had Bates accepted the theory the majority adopts today, there would have been no need to remand the case. That is, if the EPA’s approval of a label preempted States from requiring any different or additional warnings, then a failure-to-warn claim would be impossible. Our remand in Bates thus necessarily rejected the theory that the EPA’s approval of the label creates a labeling requirement that can preempt a state failure-to-warn claim.

[Omitted: the dissent’s answers to the majority’s reading of Bates, including its argument that it is irrelevant that EPA had waived efficacy review in Bates.]

Instead of relying on our precedent about FIFRA, the majority points to our decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U. S. 312 (2008). See ante, at 12–13. Riegel involved an entirely separate statute: the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA). Similar to FIFRA, the MDA established a premarket registration scheme for medical devices that included review and approval of the devices’ labeling by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 21 U. S. C. §360e(d)(1)(A). The MDA also has an express preemption provision similar to FIFRA’s. Specifically, the MDA preempts state requirements “with respect to a device intended for human use” that are “different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device.” §360k(a). We held in Riegel that “[p]remarket approval … imposes ‘requirements’” specific to medical devices under the MDA. 552 U. S., at 322–323. So, the majority says, if premarket approval under the MDA creates labeling requirements, then the EPA’s registration and approval of pesticide labels under FIFRA does too. Ante, at 13–14.

But in treating Riegel as dispositive, the majority ignores a key difference between the MDA and FIFRA: The MDA has nothing analogous to 7 U. S. C. §136a(f)(2). This matters because, again, §136a(f)(2) establishes that the EPA’s approval of a pesticide’s label is not conclusive of the label’s compliance with FIFRA and therefore cannot establish a requirement under FIFRA. Because the MDA lacks an analogous provision, it might well be that the FDA’s approval of a medical device’s label does create labeling requirements under the MDA.

Thus, it is Bates, not Riegel, that is dispositive here. Contra, ante, at 13. Bates confirms what FIFRA’s text makes clear: The EPA’s approval of a label does not create a requirement under FIFRA.

IV

Having rejected Monsanto’s express preemption argument, I conclude by addressing its alternative contention that Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim is impliedly preempted. Specifically, Monsanto argues that it is impossible to comply with both the labeling requirements of Missouri law and the labeling requirements of FIFRA. See Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U. S. 472, 480 (2013).

Monsanto is wrong. It can easily comply with both federal and state law by stopping sales of Roundup. Under FIFRA, it is unlawful to sell a misbranded pesticide. §136j(a)(1)(E). Under Missouri failure-to-warn law, manufacturers have a duty not to sell products made unreasonably dangerous by inadequate warnings. See Racer v. Utter-man, 629 S. W. 2d 387, 395 (Mo. App. 1981). Far from being incompatible, both federal and state law require Monsanto to stop selling its pesticide if the label lacks adequate warnings.

[Omitted: the dissent’s argument that Monsanto could have added a cancer warning without EPA’s prior approval, so that compliance with both state and federal law was not impossible — distinguishing PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U. S. 604 (2011), and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U. S. 472 (2013).]

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The majority reads into FIFRA a labeling requirement that does not exist, and it reads out of FIFRA the statute’s ongoing prohibition on misbranding. This interpretation cannot be squared with the text of FIFRA or our precedents. Ultimately, the effect of the majority’s interpretation is both remarkable and regrettable, for it unjustifiably closes the courthouse doors to state tort plaintiffs like Durnell.

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Notes & Questions

1. “Under,” not “by.” The Court’s textual hinge is one preposition: §136v(b) preempts state requirements “in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter,” and the Court reads “under” to reach EPA’s registration decisions, not merely FIFRA’s own commands. State the strongest case for that reading — the agency acts on delegated authority, its approvals are enforceable under §§136j(a)(1)(E) and 136l, and a manufacturer legally must use the approved label — and then the strongest case against it, which is Justice Jackson’s: that FIFRA’s misbranding standard, not EPA’s application of it, is the federal requirement, and that a state duty to warn about a real hazard is the same standard, not a different one. Notice that the Court does not answer that by parsing §136v(b) further. It answers at slip op. 14 that the argument “operates at far too high a level of generality.” Is that a textual answer?

2. What the Court did not decide. Footnote 7, entire: “Because we conclude that Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim is expressly preempted, we need not consider Monsanto’s implied preemption argument.” The words “impossibility,” “obstacle,” “field preemption” and “conflict preemption” appear nowhere in the majority; PLIVA v. Mensing and Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett are cited only by the dissent. So the intuitive framing of this case — Monsanto could not have changed the label unilaterally, therefore compliance with both was impossible — is not this case’s holding and is not even its subject. Work out what remains open after Durnell for a pesticide plaintiff whose theory is not label-based.

3. The silence about the presumption. In Rice the Court began with an assumption that state police powers survive. In Wyeth that assumption was one of two “cornerstones.” Here it is never mentioned. The phrase “presumption against” appears once in fifty-three pages, in the dissent at 18–19, and only to describe what Bates did with it; Justice Jackson does not affirmatively invoke it either. Is a canon that both sides decline to raise still law? Compare Crosby, 530 U. S., at 374, n. 7, which reserved the question and then decided the case arguendo against itself.

4. Bates, confined rather than overruled. The Court takes from Bates the proposition that state tort duties are labeling “requirements,” 544 U. S., at 446, and the proposition that EPA’s regulations “give content to FIFRA’s misbranding standards,” id., at 453 — and then draws a line Bates did not draw, between efficacy claims (not reviewed at registration, not preempted) and safety claims (reviewed, preempted). Justice Jackson’s rejoinder is structural rather than textual: Bates remanded, and a remand is impossible if label approval is itself a preempting requirement. Which move is the better use of precedent — taking a case’s reasoning or taking its disposition? And ask the harder question: is “confined to its facts” a form of overruling that avoids the cost of saying so?

5. Justice Thomas, joining in full. He joins every word and then raises three doubts: that FIFRA likely exceeds the commerce power; that EPA appears to make rules “punishable with fines or imprisonment,” a core legislative power; and — the one that belongs to this module — “whether federal agency action can preempt state law” at all under the Supremacy Clause, “a form of preemption taken for granted by the parties in this case.” Put that beside his Wyeth concurrence in the judgment, where obstacle preemption was the unconstitutional overreach. In Wyeth his objection cost the manufacturer a vote; here it costs nothing, because he thinks the text supplies the answer. Is the position the same position?

6. The Solicitor General’s promise. At slip op. 18 the Court relies on the Government’s representation at argument that EPA “doesn’t go after people for … not changing your label even though EPA doesn’t let you.” That representation does real work: it disposes of the objection that a manufacturer facing state tort liability could simply change the label and accept the federal consequences. Ask what kind of authority an oral-argument concession is, how long it binds, and what a court should do if a later administration takes a different enforcement view.

7. Where this sits in the module. Run the sequence. Hines asks courts to judge whether state law is an obstacle. Rice announces a canon and preempts anyway. Florida Lime makes impossibility a shortcut and then does the long analysis. PG&E divides a field and declines to police motive. Gade splits 4–1–4 over whether obstacle preemption is analysis at all. Crosby uses it without objection. Wyeth rejects it on these facts while Justice Thomas calls it unconstitutional. And Durnell decides a major preemption case without using it — on express preemption, reading one preposition. Is that a discipline the Court has imposed on itself, or is the work that obstacle preemption used to do now being done by a generous reading of “under”?