Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump

[Argued November 5, 2025. Decided February 20, 2026. No. 24–1287 came to the Court on certiorari BEFORE JUDGMENT to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, from the District Court for the District of Columbia; No. 25–250 came from the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, which had heard it from the Court of International Trade. The two were consolidated.]

[Read the line-up before the opinion. It is the case. The Reporter’s note: “ROBERTS, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B, in which SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A–2 and III, in which GORSUCH and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., and BARRETT, J., filed concurring opinions. KAGAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.” No numeral appears anywhere; six and three is arithmetic. Parts II–A–2 and III — the major questions analysis and the holding as stated — are a three-Justice plurality. Every passage below is labelled with the Part it comes from, so you can always tell whether you are reading the Court or three Justices.]

[The disposition is split and half of it is jurisdictional: “No. 24–1287, 784 F. Supp. 3d 209, vacated and remanded; No. 25–250, 149 F. 4th 1312, affirmed.” The vacatur in Learning Resources comes with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, because 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1) gives the Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction. So the petitioner whose name is on the case won the question and lost the case.]

[A note on citation. The running head reads “Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026)” — the volume is assigned, the page is blank. This reading carries no U.S. Reports pin cite to this case, and none has been guessed; where a pin is needed, use the slip opinion’s own pagination. Cases the opinions cite are given as the opinions give them. This is the same convention used for Landor in Module 4 and Trump v. Slaughter in Module 5A.]

[What to watch for. First, the two-step: Part II–A–1 (the Court) establishes that Article I vests the tariff power in Congress and that the Government concedes no inherent peacetime tariff authority; Part II–B (also the Court) does the statutory work — nine verbs in §1702(a)(1)(B), none of which is “tax” or “tariff,” and an export half of the same provision that would be unconstitutional on the Government’s reading. Those two parts carry six votes and never mention major questions. Second, Part II–A–2 (three Justices) runs the major questions doctrine, and Part III states the holding in the “we hold” form. Third, Justice Kagan’s concurrence, which is the pivot of the whole case: she agrees with the result, agrees with the Court’s textual analysis, and refuses the doctrine. Fourth, Youngstown on both sides — Jackson’s concurrence supplies the plurality’s line about emergencies kindling emergencies, and supplies Justice Kavanaugh’s claim that this is a category one case. Ask which use of Youngstown is truer to what Jackson wrote.]

Roberts, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II–A–2 and III.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II–A–2 and III.*

We decide whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose tariffs.

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*JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON join only Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B of this opinion.

I

A

Shortly after taking office, President Trump sought to address two foreign threats. The first was the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China. Presidential Proclamation No. 10886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121 (2025). The second was “large and persistent” trade deficits. Exec. Order No. 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (2025). The President determined that the first threat had “created a public health crisis,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113, and that the second had “led to the hollowing out” of the American manufacturing base and “undermined critical supply

chains,” id., at 15041. He invoked his authority under IEEPA to respond.

Enacted in 1977, IEEPA gives the President economic tools to address significant foreign threats. 91 Stat. 1626. When acting under IEEPA, the President must identify an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to American national security, foreign policy, or the economy, originating primarily “outside the United States.” 50 U. S. C. §1701(a). And he must “declare[ ] a national emergency” under the National Emergencies Act. Ibid.; see 90 Stat. 1255. He may then, “by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise,” take the following actions to “deal with” the threat: “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” §§1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B).

President Trump declared a national emergency as to both the drug trafficking and the trade deficits, which he deemed “unusual and extraordinary” threats. He then imposed tariffs to deal with each threat. As to the drug trafficking tariffs, the President imposed a 25% duty on most Canadian and Mexican imports and a 10% duty on most

Chinese imports. 90 Fed. Reg. 9114, 9118, 9122–9123. As to the trade deficit (or “reciprocal”) tariffs, the President imposed a duty “on all imports from all trading partners” of at least 10%. Id., at 15045. Dozens of nations faced higher rates. Id., at 15049. And these tariffs applied notwithstanding any extant trade agreements. Id., at 15045. Since imposing each set of tariffs, the President has issued several increases, reductions, and other modifications. One month after imposing the 10% drug trafficking tariffs on Chinese goods, he increased the rate to 20%. See Exec. Order No. 14228, 90 Fed. Reg. 11463 (2025). One month later, he removed a statutory exemption for Chinese goods under $800. Exec. Order No. 14256, 90 Fed. Reg. 14899 (2025). Less than a week after imposing the reciprocal tariffs, the President increased the rate on Chinese goods from 34% to 84%. Exec. Order No. 14259, 90 Fed. Reg. 15509 (2025). The very next day, he increased the rate further still, to 125%. Exec. Order No. 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625, 15626 (2025). This brought the total effective tariff rate on most Chinese goods to 145%. The President has also shifted sets of goods into and out of the reciprocal tariff framework. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14360, 90 Fed. Reg. 54091 (2025) (exempting from reciprocal tariffs beef, fruits, coffee, tea, spices, and some fertilizers); Exec. Order No. 14346, 90 Fed. Reg. 43737 (2025). And he has issued a variety of other adjustments. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14358, 90 Fed. Reg. 50729, 50730 (2025) (extending “the suspension of heightened reciprocal tariffs” on Chinese imports).

B

Petitioners in Learning Resources and respondents in V.O.S. Selections filed suit, alleging that IEEPA does not 4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

authorize the reciprocal or drug trafficking tariffs. The Learning Resources plaintiffs—two small businesses—sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs—five small businesses and 12 States—sued in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT).

The Government moved to transfer the Learning Re-sources case to the CIT. It argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1), which gives the CIT “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against” the Government “that arises out of any law of the United States providing for … tariffs” or their “administration and enforcement.” The District Court de-nied that motion and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that IEEPA did not grant the President the power to impose tariffs. 784 F. Supp. 3d 209 (DC 2025).

In the V.O.S. Selections case, the CIT granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (2025). The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed in relevant part. 149 F. 4th 1312 (2025). It first concluded that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of modifications to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Id., at 1329. On the merits, it agreed with the CIT that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate … importation” did not authorize the challenged tariffs, which “are unbounded in scope, amount, and duration.” Id., at 1338. Judge Cunningham concurred (for four judges), reasoning that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose any tariffs. Id., at 1340. Judge Taranto dissented (for four judges), concluding that IEEPA authorized the challenged tariffs. Id., at 1348. The Government filed a motion to expedite and a petition for certiorari in V.O.S. Selections, and the Learning Re-sources plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before judgment. We granted the motion and petitions and consolidated the cases. 606 U. S. 1050 (2025).1

II

Based on two words separated by 16 others in Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA—“regulate” and “importation”—the President asserts the independent power to impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time. Those words cannot bear such weight.

A

1

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution sets forth the powers of the Legislative Branch. The first Clause of that provision specifies that “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” It is no accident that this power appears first. The power to tax was, Alexander Hamilton explained, “the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union.” The Federalist No. 33, pp. 202–203 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). It is both a “power to destroy,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819), and a power “necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation”—“the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based.” Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 515 (1899).

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1 We agree with the Federal Circuit that the V.O.S. Selections case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT. The plaintiffs’ challenges “arise[ ] out of ” modifications to the HTSUS. 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1). Where, as here, such modifications are made under an “Act[ ] affecting import treatment,” 19 U. S. C. §2483, they are “considered to be statutory provisions of law for all purposes,” §3004(c)(1)(C). Thus, the plaintiffs’ challenges “arise[ ] out of [a] law of the United States providing for … tariffs.” 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1). For the same reasons, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia lacked jurisdiction in the Learning Resources case.

The power to impose tariffs is “very clear[ly] … a branch of the taxing power.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201 (1824). “A tariff,” after all, “is a tax levied on imported goods and services.” Congressional Research Service

(CRS), C. Casey, U. S. Tariff Policy: Overview 1 (2025). And tariffs “raise[ ] revenue,” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 193 (1994)—the defining feature of a tax, United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28, and n. 4 (1953); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 514 (1937). In-deed, the Framers expected that the Government would for “a long time depend … chiefly on” tariffs for revenue. The Federalist No. 12, at 93 (A. Hamilton). Little wonder, then, that the First Congress’s first exercise of its taxing power (and its second enacted law, right after the one providing for the new officials to take an oath) was a tariff law. See Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.

Recognizing the taxing power’s unique importance, and having just fought a revolution motivated in large part by “taxation without representation,” the Framers gave Congress “alone … access to the pockets of the people.” The Federalist No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison); see also Declaration of Independence ¶19. They required “All Bills for raising Revenue [to] originate in the House of Representatives.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 1. And in doing so, they ensured that only the House could “propose the supplies requisite for the support of government,” thereby reducing “all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches.” The Federalist No. 58, at 359 (J. Madison). They did not vest any part of the taxing power in the Executive Branch. See Nicol, 173 U. S., at 515 (“[T]he whole power of taxation rests with Congress”).

The Government thus concedes, as it must, that the President enjoys no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime. Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71. And it does not defend the challenged tariffs as an exercise of the President’s warmaking powers. The United States, after all, is not at Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

war with every nation in the world. The Government in-stead relies exclusively on IEEPA. It reads the words “regulate” and “importation” to effect a sweeping delegation of Congress’s power to set tariff policy—authorizing the President to impose tariffs of unlimited amount and duration, on any product from any country. 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B).

2

We have long expressed “reluctan[ce] to read into ambiguous statutory text” extraordinary delegations of Congress’s powers. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324 (2014)). In Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 (2023), for example, we declined to read authorization to “waive or modify” statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to financial assistance programs as a delegation of power to cancel $430 billion in student loan debt. Id., at 494 (quoting 20 U. S. C. §1098bb(a)(1)). In West Virginia v. EPA, we declined to read authorization to determine the “best system of emission reduction” as a delegation of power to force a nationwide transition away from the use of coal. 597 U. S., at 732 (quoting 42 U. S. C. §7411(a)(1)). And in National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam), we declined to read authorization to ensure “safe and healthful working conditions” as a delegation of power to impose a vaccine mandate on 84 million Americans. Id., at 114, 117 (quoting 29 U. S. C. §651(b)); see also, e.g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758, 764–765 (2021) (per curiam); King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485– 486 (2015); Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324.

We have described several of these cases as “major questions” cases. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 505; West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 732; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000) (citing S. Breyer, 8 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986)). In each, the Government claimed broad, expansive power on an uncertain statutory basis. And in each, the statutory text might “[a]s a matter of definitional possibilities” have been read to delegate the asserted power. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted). But “context” counseled “skepticism.” Id., at 721, 732. That context included not just other language within the statute, but “constitutional structure” and “common sense.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512, 515 (BARRETT, J., concurring). “[B]oth separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative in-tent” suggested Congress would not have delegated “highly consequential power” through ambiguous language. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723–724.

These considerations apply with particular force where, as here, the purported delegation involves the core congressional power of the purse. “Congress would likely … in-tend[ ] for itself ” the “basic and consequential tradeoffs,” id., at 730, inherent in uses of this “most complete and effectual weapon,” The Federalist No. 58, at 359. And if Congress were to relinquish that weapon to another branch, a “reasonable interpreter” would expect it to do so “ ‘clearly.’ ” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514–515 (BARRETT, J., concurring) (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324).

What common sense suggests, congressional practice confirms. When Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits. Congress has consistently used words like “duty” in statutes delegating authority to impose tariffs. (A customs “duty” is simply “the federal tax levied on goods shipped into the United States.” Black’s Law Dictionary 638 (12th ed. 2024).) See, e.g., 19 U. S. C. §1338(d) (“rates of duty”); §2132(a) (“temporary import surcharge … in the form of duties”); §2253(a)(3)(A) (“duty on the imported article”); §2411(c)(1)(B) (“duties or other import restrictions”). It has Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

capped the amount and duration of tariffs. See, e.g., §1338(d) (50% cap); §2132(a) (15% cap, 150-day time limit); §2253(e) (50% cap, phasedown requirement after one year). And it has conditioned exercise of the tariff power on de-manding procedural prerequisites. See, e.g., §2252 (investigation by the United States International Trade Commission, public hearings, report of findings and

recommendation); §§2411–2414 (investigation by the

United States Trade Representative, consultation with relevant country and interested parties, publication of findings).2

Against this backdrop of clear and limited delegations, the Government reads IEEPA to give the President power to unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs. On this reading, moreover, the President is unconstrained by the significant procedural limitations in other tariff statutes and free to issue a dizzying array of modifications at will. See supra, at 3. All it takes to unlock that extraordinary power is a Presidential declaration of emergency, which the Government asserts is unreviewable. Brief for Federal Parties 42. And the only way of restraining the exercise of that power is a veto-proof majority in Congress. See 50 U. S. C. §1622(a)(1) (requiring a “joint resolution” “enacted into law” to terminate a national emergency). That view, if credited, would “represent[ ] a ‘transformative expansion’ ” of the President’s authority over tariff policy, West Virginia, 597 ——————

2 The same is true of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 877, which we have held authorizes sector-specific import “license fee[s].” Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 571 (1976). Section 232(a) expressly references “duties.” 19 U. S. C. §1862(a); see infra, at 19. And Section 232(c) authorizes the President to “adjust the imports” of an “article,” §1862(c), but only after the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, conducts an investigation and prepares a report finding that the “article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security,” §1862(b).

U. S., at 724 (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324), and in-deed—as demonstrated by the exercise of that authority in this case—over the broader economy as well. See Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Current View of the Economy From 2025 to 2028, p. 5 (Sept. 2025); Brief for Federal Parties 2–3. It would replace the longstanding executive-legislative collaboration over trade policy with unchecked Presidential policymaking. See CRS, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy (2015). Congress seldom effects such sea changes through “vague language.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724.

It is also telling that in IEEPA’s “half century of existence,” no President has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs—let alone tariffs of this magnitude and scope. National Federation of Independent Business, 595 U. S., at 119.3 Presidents have, by contrast, regularly invoked IEEPA for other purposes. CRS, C. Casey, J. Elsea, & L. Rosen, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use 18–21 (2025). At the same time, they have invoked other statutes—but never

IEEPA—to impose tariffs, on products ranging from car tires to washing machines. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 8414, 3 CFR 115 (2009 Comp.); Presidential ——————

3 Indeed, even before IEEPA was enacted, only one President relied on its predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411, to impose tariffs—and then only as a post hoc defense to a legal challenge. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971) (initially invoking the Tariff Act of 1930 and Trade Expansion Act of 1962); United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572 (CCPA 1975). Those tariffs were also of limited amount, duration, and scope. See id., at 568–569, 577–578 (noting that the 10-percent surcharge was described by President Nixon as “ ‘a temporary measure,’ ” was in effect less than five months, applied only to “articles which had been the sub-ject of prior tariff concessions,” and was capped at congressionally authorized rates); Economic Report of the President 70 (1972) (“When all exceptions to the 10-percent rule were taken into account, the effective rate of surcharge came down to 4.8 percent”).

Proclamation No. 9694, 83 Fed. Reg. 3553 (2018). And those tariffs did not “even beg[in] to approach the size or scope” of the IEEPA tariffs at issue here. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 502 (quoting Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 765). The “ ‘lack of historical precedent’ ” for the IEEPA tariffs, “coupled with the breadth of authority” that the President now claims, “is a ‘telling indication’ ” that the tariffs extend beyond the President’s “legitimate reach.” National Federation of Independent Business, 595 U. S., at 119 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-sight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 505 (2010)).

The “ ‘economic and political significance’ ” of the authority the President has asserted likewise “provide[s] a ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such authority.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160). The President’s assertion here of broad “statutory power over the national economy” is “extravagant” by any measure. Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324. And as the Government admits— indeed, boasts—the economic and political consequences of the IEEPA tariffs are astonishing. The Government points to projections that the tariffs will reduce the national deficit by $4 trillion, and that international agreements reached in reliance on the tariffs could be worth $15 trillion. Brief for Federal Parties 3, 11. In the President’s view, whether “we are a rich nation” or a “poor” one hangs in the balance. Id., at 2. These stakes dwarf those of other major questions cases. See, e.g., Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 483 ($430 billion); Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 764 (nearly $50 billion); West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 714 (“billions of dollars in compliance costs”). As in those cases, “a reasonable interpreter would [not] expect” Congress to “pawn[ ]” such a “big-time policy call[ ] … off to another branch.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 515 (BARRETT, J., concurring).

The Government and the principal dissent attempt to avoid application of the major questions doctrine on several grounds. None is convincing.

The Government argues first that the doctrine should not apply to emergency statutes. Brief for Federal Parties 35– 36. But this argument is nearly identical to one it already advanced in Nebraska. There, the Government contended that a different emergency statute should be interpreted broadly because its “whole point” was to provide “substantial discretion to … respond to unforeseen emergencies.” 600 U. S., at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected that argument in Nebraska, and we reject it here as well. “Emergency powers,” after all, “tend to kindle emergencies.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Dozens of IEEPA emergencies remain ongoing today, including the first—declared over four decades ago in response to the Iranian hostage crisis. CRS, Casey, International Emergency Economic Powers Act, at 20. And as the Framers under-stood, emergencies can “afford a ready pretext for usurpation” of congressional power. Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring). Where Congress has reason to be worried about its powers “slipping through its fingers,” id., at 654, we in turn have every reason to expect Congress to use clear language to effectuate unbounded delegations— particularly of its “one great power,” Nicol, 173 U. S., at 515.

The Government’s and the principal dissent’s proposed foreign affairs exception fares no better. Brief for Federal Parties 34–35; post, at 45–57 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). As a general matter, the President of course enjoys some “independent constitutional power[s]” over foreign affairs “even without congressional authorization.” FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U. S. 656, 707 (2025) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring). And Congress certainly may intend to “give the President substantial authority and flexibility” in many Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

foreign affairs or national security contexts. Post, at 48 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (quoting Consumers’ Research, 606 U. S., at 706 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring)). But

“flip[ping]” the “presumption” under the major questions doctrine, Brief for Federal Parties 34, makes little sense when it comes to tariffs. As the Government admits, the President and Congress do not “enjoy concurrent constitutional authority” to impose tariffs during peacetime. Ibid.; Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71. The Framers gave that power to “Congress alone”—notwithstanding the obvious foreign affairs implications of tariffs. Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S. 694, 700 (1882). And whatever may be said of other powers that implicate foreign affairs, we would not expect Congress to relinquish its tariff power through vague language, or without careful limits.

The central thrust of the Government’s and the principal dissent’s proposed exceptions appears to be that ambiguous delegations in statutes addressing “the most major of major questions” should necessarily be construed broadly. Brief for Federal Parties 35. But it simply does not follow from the fact that a statute deals with major problems that it should be read to delegate all major powers for which there may be a “colorable textual basis.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 722. It is in precisely such cases that we should be alert to claims that sweeping delegations—particularly delegations of core congressional powers—“lurk[ ]” in “ambiguous statutory text.” Id., at 723 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no major questions exception to the major questions doctrine.

Accordingly, the President must “point to clear congressional authorization” to justify his extraordinary assertion of the power to impose tariffs. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted). He cannot.

B

To begin, IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit … importation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B). Absent from this lengthy list of powers is any mention of tariffs or duties. That omission is notable in light of the significant but specific powers Congress did go to the trouble of naming. It stands to reason that had Congress intended to convey the distinct and extraordinary power to impose tariffs, it would have done so expressly—as it consistently has in other tariff statutes. See supra, at 8; accord, post, at 11, 26– 27 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).

The power to “regulate … importation” does not fill that void. “Regulate,” as that term is ordinarily used, means to “fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979); see also Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U. S. 685, 697 (2022). This definition captures much of what a government does on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, if “regulate” is as broad as the principal dissent suggests, post, at 10–11, then the other eight verbs in §1702(a)(1)(B) are simply wasted ink. But the facial breadth of “regulate” places in stark relief what the term is not usually thought to include: taxation. The U. S. Code is replete with statutes granting the Executive the authority to “regulate” someone or something. Yet the Government cannot identify any statute in which the power to regulate includes the power to tax. The Government concedes, for example, that the Securities and Exchange Commission cannot tax the trading of securities, even though it is expressly authorized to “regulate the trading of … securities.” 15 U. S. C. §78i(h)(1); see Brief for Federal Parties 31–32. We are therefore skeptical that in IEEPA—and IEEPA alone—Congress hid a

delegation of its birth-right power to tax within the quotidian power to “regulate.”

Taxes, to be sure, may accomplish regulatory ends. See Sonzinsky, 300 U. S., at 513; Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201– 202. But it does not follow that the power to regulate something includes the power to tax it as a means of regulation. Congressional practice suggests as much. When Congress addresses both the power to regulate and the power to tax, it does so separately and expressly. See, e.g., 16 U. S. C. §460bbb–9(a) (distinguishing between the power to “tax persons, franchise, or private property” on lands and the power “to regulate the private lands”); 2 U. S. C.

§622(8)(B)(i) (“government-sponsored enterprise” does not have the “power to tax or to regulate interstate commerce”). That is unsurprising, as the “power to regulate commerce” is “entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes.” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201. That Congress did not grant those authorities separately here is strong evidence that “regulate” in IEEPA does not include taxation.

A contrary reading would render IEEPA partly unconstitutional. IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate … importation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Taxing exports, however, is expressly forbidden by the Constitution. Art. I, §9, cl. 5.

The “neighboring words” with which “regulate” “is associated” also suggest that Congress did not intend for “regulate” to include the revenue-raising power. United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008). “Regulate” is one of nine verbs listed in §1702(a)(1)(B). Each authorizes a distinct action a President might take in sanctioning foreign actors or controlling domestic actors engaged in foreign commerce—blocking imports, for example, or prohibiting transactions. Presidential practice under IEEPA demonstrates as much. See CRS, Casey, International Emergency Economic Powers Act, at 79–106 (Table A–3); see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13194, 3 CFR 741 (2001 Comp.) (blocking

importation of diamonds from insurgent regime in Sierra Leone); Exec. Order No. 12947, 3 CFR 319 (1995 Comp.) (prohibiting transactions with those “who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process”). None of IEEPA’s authorities includes the distinct and extraordinary power to raise revenue. And the fact that no President has ever found such power in IEEPA is strong evidence that it does not exist. See supra, at 10; FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 351–352 (1941).

We do not attempt to set forth the metes and bounds of the President’s authority to “regulate … importation” un-der IEEPA. That “interpretive question” is “not at issue” in this case, and any answer would be “plain dicta.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 734–735, and n. 5. Our task today is to decide only whether the power to “regulate … importation,” as granted to the President in IEEPA, embraces the power to impose tariffs. It does not.4

The Government, echoed point-for-point by the principal dissent, marshals several arguments in response. First, it contends that IEEPA confers the power to impose tariffs because early commentators and this Court’s cases discuss tariffs in the context of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. See Brief for Federal Parties 24–25; post, at 12–13 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). But that answers the wrong question. The question is not, as the Government would have it, whether tariffs can ever be a means of regulating commerce. It is instead whether Congress, when conferring the power to “regulate … importation,” gave the President the power to impose tariffs at his sole discretion. And ——————

4 The principal dissent surmises that the President could impose “most if not all” of the tariffs at issue under statutes other than IEEPA. Post, at 62 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). The cited statutes contain various combinations of procedural prerequisites, required agency determinations, and limits on the duration, amount, and scope of the tariffs they authorize. See supra, at 8–9; post, at 62–63. We do not speculate on hypothetical cases not before us.

Congress’s pattern of usage is most relevant to answering that question. That pattern is plain: When Congress grants the power to impose tariffs, it does so clearly and with careful constraints. It did neither here.

The Government raises another contextual argument. Because “regulate” “lies between” two “poles” in IEEPA— “compel” on the affirmative end and “prohibit” on the negative end—the term naturally includes the “less extreme, more flexible” tool of tariffs. Reply Brief 9 (internal quotation marks omitted); see post, at 29–30 (opinion of

KAVANAUGH, J.) (making a greater-includes-the-lesser argument). But tariffs, as discussed above, are different in kind, not degree, from the other authorities in IEEPA. Un-like those authorities, tariffs operate directly on domestic importers to raise revenue for the Treasury. See 19 U. S. C. §1505(a); 19 CFR §141.1(b) (2025). Even though a tariff is, in some sense, “less extreme” than an outright compulsion or prohibition, it does not follow that tariffs lie on the spectrum between those poles. They are instead “very clear[ly] … a branch of the taxing power,” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201, and fall outside the spectrum entirely.

Finding no support in the statute the President invoked, the Government turns to one he did not: IEEPA’s predecessor, TWEA. Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. In 1975, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the authority to “regulate … importation” in TWEA authorized President Nixon to impose limited tariffs. United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572, 577–578. When Congress en-acted IEEPA two years later, the Government contends, it conveyed that same authority (except without the limits). See also post, at 14–17 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).

This argument cannot bear the weight the Government places on it. While this Court sometimes assumes that Congress incorporates judicial definitions into legislation, we do so “only when [the] term’s meaning was ‘well-settled’ ” before the adoption. Kemp v. United States, 596 U. S. 528, 18 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

539 (2022) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 22 (1999)); see also United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 412–415 (2015). A single, expressly limited opinion from a specialized intermediate appellate court does not clear that hurdle.5 See BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 244 (2021). The tariff authority asserted by President Nixon, moreover, was “far removed” from TWEA’s “original purposes” of sanctioning foreign belligerents. Cohen, Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign Trade Policy, at 178–179. We are therefore skeptical that Congress enacted IEEPA with an eye toward granting that novel power.

The Government has another historical argument based on this Court’s wartime precedents. See generally Brief for Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae; Reply Brief 9– 11, 18. According to the Government, those precedents acknowledge an inherent Presidential power to impose tariffs during armed conflict. And, the argument goes, Congress in TWEA, and then in IEEPA, codified those precedents. But this argument fails at both steps. Insofar as the Government relies on our wartime cases themselves, they are facially inapposite. Regardless of what they might mean for the President’s inherent wartime authority, all ——————

5 The Government, citing the IEEPA House Committee Report, contends that Congress “indisputably knew of ” Yoshida’s interpretation of TWEA. Brief for Federal Parties 26; see also post, at 15–16, and n. 11 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). But even taking the Report at face value, it hardly helps the Government. The Report explains that “[s]uccessive Presidents have seized upon the open-endedness of [TWEA] section 5(b) to turn that section, through usage, into something quite different from what was envisioned in 1917.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, pp. 8–9 (1977); accord, S. Cohen, R. Blecker, & P. Whitney, Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign Trade Policy 178–179 (2d ed. 2003). That is not exactly a stamp of approval on the action Yoshida guardedly endorsed. And in any event, the Government’s “knew of ” standard falls well short of the “broad and unquestioned” “judicial consensus” we have required to conclude that Congress incorporated a judicial definition into a statutory term. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349 (2005). agree that the President has no inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs.

Nor are we persuaded that the dots connect from our wartime precedents, through multiple iterations of TWEA, to IEEPA, such that IEEPA should be interpreted to grant the President an expansive peacetime tariff power. This argument relies extensively on a series of inferences drawn from scant legislative history. Such an attenuated chain cannot support—much less “clearly” support—a reading of IEEPA that includes the distinct power to impose tariffs. Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 764.

Turning to this Court’s precedents, the Government first relies on Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976). There, we held that Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the President to “adjust the imports” of particular goods to protect national security, includes the power to impose “license fees.” Id., at 561. But that holding bears little on the meaning of IEEPA. As a textual matter, Section 232(b) authorizes the President not only to “adjust … imports,” but (as the Government emphasized in Algonquin) to “take such action … as he deems necessary” to adjust the imports of a good. Brief for Petitioners 26 (emphasis in original) and Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–7, in Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., O. T. 1975, No. 75–382. IEEPA does not contain such sweeping, discretion-conferring language. As for context, Section 232(a) states that “[n]o action shall be taken” to “decrease or eliminate” an existing “duty or other import restriction” if doing so would threaten national security. 19 U. S. C. §1862(a) (1970 ed.). This explicit reference to duties preceding Section 232(b) renders it natural for Section 232(b) itself to authorize duties. Thus, we de-cline to extend Algonquin’s expressly “limited” holding any further. 426 U. S., at 571.

Finally, the Government invokes Dames & Moore v. Re-gan, 453 U. S. 654 (1981), but that case offers no support. 20 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

Dames & Moore was exceedingly narrow,6 did not address the President’s power to “regulate,” and did not involve tariffs at all. If anything, that case highlights the importance of close attention to IEEPA’s text. “The terms of … IEEPA,” we held, “do not authorize” the suspension of claims. Id., at 675. So too here; the terms of IEEPA do not authorize tariffs.

III

The President asserts the extraordinary power to unilaterally impose tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and scope. In light of the breadth, history, and constitutional context of that asserted authority, he must identify clear congressional authorization to exercise it.

IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate … importation” falls short. IEEPA contains no reference to tariffs or duties. The Government points to no statute in which Congress used the word “regulate” to authorize taxation. And until now no President has read IEEPA to confer such power. We claim no special competence in matters of economics or foreign affairs. We claim only, as we must, the limited role assigned to us by Article III of the Constitution. Fulfilling that role, we hold that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.

——————

6 See, e.g., 453 U. S., at 660 (“We are confined to a resolution of the dispute presented to us”); ibid. (We are “acutely aware of the necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the case”); id., at 661 (“We attempt to lay down no general ‘guidelines’ covering other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the case”); ibid. (“[T]he decisions of the Court in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford little precedential value for subsequent cases”); id., at 688 (“[W]e re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision”). This is not quite “no, no, a thousand times no,” but should have sufficed to dissuade the principal dissent from invoking the case, see post, at 55–56, with respect to the quite distinct legal and factual issues present here. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in case No. 25–250 is affirmed. The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in case No. 24–1287 is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

It is so ordered.

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GORSUCH, J., concurring.

[Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence runs to roughly 15,000 words — the longest opinion in the case — and is an extended defence of the major questions doctrine against both dissents and against Justice Barrett’s purely textualist framing of it. His opening and the head of his closing Part IV are given here; Parts I through III, and the balance of Part IV, are omitted for length]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.

The President claims that Congress delegated to him an extraordinary power in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)—the power to impose tariffs on practically any products he wants, from any countries he chooses, in any amounts he selects. Applying the major questions doctrine, the principal opinion rejects that argument. I join in full. The Constitution lodges the Nation’s lawmaking powers in Congress alone, and the major questions doctrine safeguards that assignment against executive encroachment. Under the doctrine’s terms, the President must identify clear statutory authority for the extraordinary delegated power he claims. And, as the principal opinion explains, that is a standard he cannot meet. 2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

Whatever else might be said about Congress’s work in IEEPA, it did not clearly surrender to the President the sweeping tariff power he seeks to wield.

Not everyone sees it this way. Past critics of the major questions doctrine do not object to its application in this case, and they even join much of today’s principal opinion. But, they insist, they can reach the same result by employing only routine tools of statutory interpretation. Post, at 1 (KAGAN, J., joined by SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Meanwhile, one colleague who joins the principal opinion in full suggests the major questions doctrine is nothing more than routine statutory interpretation. Post, at 1 (BARRETT, J., concurring). Still others who have joined major questions decisions in the past dissent from today’s application of the doctrine. Post, at 1 (KAVANAUGH, J., joined by THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., dissenting). Finally, seeking to sidestep the major questions doctrine altogether, one colleague submits that Congress may hand over to the President most of its powers, including the tariff power, without limit. Post, at 1–2 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). It is an interesting turn of events. Each camp warrants a visit.

IV

That leaves one final camp to consider. JUSTICE THOMAS suggests that Congress may hand over most of its constitutionally vested powers to the President completely and forever. Post, at 2–3 (dissenting opinion). On his view, the only powers Congress may not delegate are those that involve “rules setting the conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property.” Ibid. From this rule, it follows that Congress may give all its tariff powers to the President because “[i]mporting is a matter of privilege.” Post, at 10–11. And, as a result, this case does not implicate any “ ‘ “separation of powers” ’ ” concerns at all. Post, at 3 (quoting ante, at 8).

It’s a sweeping theory. One that would require us to reimagine much of our case law addressing Article I’s Vesting Clause. And one that presents difficulties of its own. First, I do not see how JUSTICE THOMAS’s theory resolves all “ ‘ “separation of powers” ’ ” concerns in this case. Post, at 3 (quoting ante, at 8). Suppose for argument’s sake that Congress can delegate its tariff powers to the President as completely as JUSTICE THOMAS suggests. Even then, the question remains whether Congress has given the President the tariff authority he claims in this case—or whether the President is seeking to exploit questionable statutory language to aggrandize his own power. See Part I–C, supra. Put another way, JUSTICE THOMAS’s nondelegation solution does not automatically solve the major questions problem. As we have seen, when an executive official claims Congress has delegated to him some extraordinary power, the major questions doctrine requires him to identify clear statutory authority for its exercise—a standard he ——————

reasons we have just seen. Even if the nondelegation doctrine should apply differently when congressional legislation and executive actions implicate inherent Article II powers, Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159, none of that means it should do so where (as here) the President derives whatever authority he has only from Congress.

must satisfy even if Congress is free to pass to him the power he seeks. Post, at 2–3. In fact, this Court has previously applied, with our colleague’s assent, the major questions doctrine in a case that appears, under his present view, to involve a power that Congress could delegate wholesale to the President. See Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 486–488 (involving the power to cancel federal student loan debts, which on JUSTICE THOMAS’s account presumably

qualifies as a benefit or privilege, not a right to life, liberty, or property). And, just as the major questions doctrine precluded the executive branch’s assertion of power in that case, it does so here.

Second, even when it comes to the nondelegation doctrine, JUSTICE THOMAS’s theory raises many questions. I appreciate that the doctrine may apply with less force in certain areas, such as when Congress legislates in a way that implicates one of the President’s inherent powers. See Part III–B, supra; Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). But JUSTICE THOMAS would go much further. On his telling, the doctrine applies only to Congress’s true legislative powers, which he says include only those powers addressing the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. As it turns out, only a small subset of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I, §8, fit that bill. See post, at 5–6 (listing the powers to punish counterfeiters, tax “internal[ly],” and regulate interstate commerce). Only those few powers are exclusively vested in Congress and subject to review of any kind under the nondelegation doctrine. All “other kinds of power[s]” enumerated in Article I, §8—including the powers to borrow and spend money, declare war, and regulate foreign trade—are not truly legislative and may be delegated at will. Post, at 2. So Congress may hand them off to the President completely and he has no need to worry about legal challenges under even this Court’s (relatively lax) nondelegation doctrine. No matter, too, that Congress 42 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

might find itself permanently unable to retrieve these powers. See Part I–C, supra.

But if all that’s true, what do we make of the Constitution’s text? Section 1 of Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” in Congress and no one else. Section 8 proceeds to list those powers in detail and without differentiation. Neither provision speaks of some divide between true legislative powers touching on “life, liberty, or property” that are permanently vested in Congress alone and “other kinds of power[s]” that may be given away and possibly lost forever to the President. Post, at 2.

What do we make, too, of what the founders said about Article I both before and after the Constitution’s ratification? They regularly referred to powers in Article I, §8— even those that do not touch on life, liberty, or property— as legislative in nature. At the Constitutional Convention, early drafts described the powers to regulate “foreign” commerce, “raise armies,” “equip Fleets,” “coi[n] … money,” and “establish post-offices” as “legislative powers.” 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 142–144 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) (Farrand). James Madison wrote to Congress in 1817 that “[t]he legislative powers vested in Congress are specified and enumerated in the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution.” 8 The Writings of James Madison 386 (G. Hunt ed. 1908); see also 1 id., at 112, 133, 381 (noting, before the Constitutional Convention, the “legislative power over captures,” and arguing borrowing money is an “exclusive power of Legislation”).

Alexander Hamilton spoke similarly. 3 The Works of Alexander Hamilton 479 (H. Lodge ed. 1904) (Lodge) (discussing “[t]he legislative power of borrowing money”); 6 id., at 182 (describing “the legislative power of regulating trade with foreign nations”); 2 id., at 197, 198 (calling of “the legislative kind” and “of a legislative nature” the powers to raise money and troops, “establish rules in all cases of capture by sea or land,” “regulate the alloy and value of coin,” and “make all laws for the government of the army and navy”). So did James Wilson. 1 Collected Works of James Wilson 268 (K. Hall & D. Hall eds. 2007) (describing all the Senate’s powers as “legislative powers,” with the exception of the powers to try impeachments, concur in treaties, and consent to the appointment of officers, matters addressed outside Art. I, §8).

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BARRETT, J., concurring.

JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring.

As the principal opinion demonstrates, the most natural reading of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not encompass the power to impose tariffs. I write only to address JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence regarding the major questions doctrine.

To the extent that JUSTICE GORSUCH attacks the view that “common sense” alone can explain all our major questions decisions, ante, at 18–22, he takes down a straw man. I have never espoused that view. Rather, as I explained in my concurrence in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 507 (2023), the major questions doctrine “situates text in context” and is therefore best understood as an ordinary application of textualism. Id., at 511. Textualists—like all those 2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

who use language to communicate—do not interpret words in a vacuum. Instead, we use context, including “[b]ack-ground legal conventions,” “common sense,” and “constitutional structure,” to ascertain a text’s “most natural meaning.” Id., at 511–512, 515, 509.

Part of this context, as I have explained, is Article I of the Constitution, which vests Congress with “ ‘[a]ll legislative Powers.’ ” Id., at 515 (quoting Art. I, §1). Obviously, the Constitution bears on the meaning of a statute enacted pursuant to it. Because Article I grants all legislative powers to Congress, the reasonable interpreter would expect Congress “to make the big-time policy calls itself, rather than pawning them off to another branch.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 515 (BARRETT, J., concurring).1

To the extent that JUSTICE GORSUCH also thinks that background legal conventions and constitutional structure inform the most natural reading of a statute, then we may not be very far apart. See ante, at 8–12, 14 (concurring opinion). Our only disagreement may be over the level of clarity required before a particular interpretation can be deemed the most natural one. I understand JUSTICE

GORSUCH to require Congress always to speak precisely to any major power that it intends to give away. See ante, at 12–14, 25–26 (concurring opinion). As I have said before, I think that other, “less obvious” clues can do the trick. See Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514 (BARRETT, J., concurring). I do not see any such clues here; in fact, as the Court explains, the clues we have point in the opposite direction. See, e.g., ante, at 8–9 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (detailing how ——————

1 Contrary to JUSTICE GORSUCH’s suggestion, this approach to the major questions doctrine does not risk “conflating unenacted legislative in-tent with the law.” Ante, at 24, n. 2 (concurring opinion). Rather, like textualism more generally, it looks for “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris,” including the Constitution. A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17 (1997). Congress has elsewhere delegated the power to impose tariffs); ante, at 14–15 (majority opinion) (stressing that the Government “cannot identify any statute in which the power to regulate includes the power to tax”).

At times, though, JUSTICE GORSUCH suggests that the purpose of the major questions doctrine is something other than to ascertain the most natural reading of a statute. For example, he writes that the doctrine serves to prevent “highly resourceful members of the executive branch” from “assum[ing] new power for themselves” because “men are not angels.” Ante, at 16 (concurring opinion); see West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 735 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (describing doctrine as a “clear-statement rul[e]” that “operates to protect foundational constitutional guarantees”); National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109, 124–126 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (similar). But if the Constitution permits Congress to give the Executive a particular power, who are we to get in the way? Does the Judiciary really protect the Constitution by impeding the constitutional action of another branch? If JUSTICE GORSUCH thinks that we should forgo the most natural reading of a statute because it is preferable for Congress, rather than the President, to make big decisions, that way lies “a lot of trouble” for the textualist. A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 28 (1997) (Scalia). Strong-form substantive canons—canons instructing a judge to adopt “an inferior-but-tenable reading”—veer beyond interpretation and into policymaking. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 509 (BARRETT, J., concurring). And while the policy may be desirable or even constitutionally inspired, judges should hesitate to impose disciplining rules on Congress. See ibid., n. 2 (explaining that such “prophylactic constraints” are “in tension with the Constitution’s structure”). As Justice Scalia lamented, “whether these dice-loading rules are bad or good, there is also the question of where the courts get the authority to impose them. Can we 4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

really just decree that we will interpret the laws that Congress passes to mean less or more than what they fairly say?” Scalia 28–29.

Granted, strong-form canons exist elsewhere in the law. See Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508–509 (BARRETT, J., concurring). I do not propose to abandon these canons, nor have I taken the position that adopting them necessarily exceeds the judicial power. Id., at 509, n. 2. But I am skeptical about adding new ones to the mix. Ibid. And while the major questions doctrine has an impressive pedigree as an interpretive principle, this Court has not (yet, anyway) embraced it as a strong-form rule that imposes a “ ‘clarity tax’ ” on Congress. Id., at 508.

JUSTICE GORSUCH seems to disagree, pointing to a few late 19th-and early 20th-century cases.2 See ante, at 12– 14 (concurring opinion). But these cases, like our modern ones, are consistent with my context-based approach: They focus on ascertaining, not shaping, what the statute in dispute communicates. See, e.g., ICC v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 511 (1897) (concluding that Congress “did not intend” to give interstate commission power to set railroad rates); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 196 (1909) (reasoning that “the legislature never intended to and did not in fact” give a state commission power to set maximum railroad rates). I would not treat this evidence as precedent for a judicial flex. JUSTICE GORSUCH proposes to do something new. The innovation is in significant tension with textualism, so I do not support the project.

——————

2 He also points to state cases and longstanding corporate law principles. Ante, at 8–13 (concurring opinion). While those sources support the existence of a background legal convention that informs a statute’s most natural meaning, they are not evidence that this Court—which is bound by the constraints of Article III—has adopted a true clear-state-ment rule.

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KAGAN, J., with whom SOTOMAYOR, J., and JACKSON, J., join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and

JUSTICE JACKSON join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

The Court holds today that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. I agree with that conclusion, as I do with the bulk of the principal opinion’s reasoning. But because I think the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation amply support today’s result, I do not join the part of that opinion invoking the so-called major-questions doctrine. The question that part asks, similar to the one posed in other “ ‘major questions’ cases,” is whether the President can identify “clear congressional authorization” for his action—here, to impose tariffs under IEEPA. Ante, at 7, 13, 20. The demand is for a clear statement—something more 2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

explicit or specific than the statutory basis that would ordinarily suffice to support executive action. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 721–724, 732 (2022); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 505–506 (2023). The reason for that requirement, according to today’s opinion, is that the Executive has claimed an “extraordinary” power—one

never asserted before and having large-scale “economic and political significance.” Ante, at 7, 11; see ante, at 7–11. I objected, in the principal cases cited, to the demand for a special brand of legislative clarity. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 764–784 (KAGAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 542–550 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). In my view, the Court used its clear-authorization rule in those cases to negate expansive delegations Congress had approved. I explained there that the proper way to interpret a delegation provision is through the standard rules of statutory construction. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 765–766 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). That means, most concisely stated, reading text in context. More expansively put, it means examining a delegation provision’s language, assessing that provision’s place in the broader statutory scheme, and applying a “modicum of common sense” about how Congress typically delegates. Id., at 764 (KAGAN, J., dissenting); see FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133

(2000). The last of those inquiries includes consideration of whether Congress ever has before, or likely would, delegate the power the Executive asserts—a matter also of import in applying the major-questions doctrine. See ante, at 8–10; Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512–514, 517–519 (BARRETT, J., concurring); id., at 546, n. 3 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). In the past, though, I have thought that the Court used that doctrine to override—rather than help discover—the best reading of delegation statutes. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 756 (KAGAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 543 (KAGAN, J., dissenting).

This case presents more nearly the opposite situation: The use of a clear-statement rule here is unnecessary because ordinary principles of statutory interpretation lead to the same result.1 It is not just that the Government’s arguments fail to satisfy an especially strict test; it is that they fail to satisfy the normal one. Even without a clear-state-ment rule in the picture, the conclusion follows: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. And indeed, the principal opinion’s reasoning well explains why. The rest of this opinion draws on that analysis (I hope without too much rehashing) to demonstrate what I view as the fundamental point: Usual text-in-context interpretation dooms the tariffs the President has imposed. The crucial provision of IEEPA, when viewed in light of the broader statutory scheme and with a practical awareness of how Congress delegates tariff authority, does not give the President the power he wants.

Most important, IEEPA’s key phrase—the one the Government relies on—says nothing about imposing tariffs or ——————

1 JUSTICE GORSUCH claims not to understand this statement, insisting that I now must be applying the major-questions doctrine, and his own version of it to boot. See ante, at 17 (concurring opinion) (“My concurring colleagues all but endorse it today”); ante, at 2, 7, 18 (similar). Given how strong his apparent desire for converts, see ante, at 2–26, I almost regret to inform him that I am not one. But that is the fact of the matter. I proceed in this case just as I did in West Virginia and Nebraska: I consider a delegation provision’s language, broaden the scope to take in the statutory setting, and apply some common sense about how Congress normally delegates. See West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 756–766 (2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 534– 542 (2023) (KAGAN, J., dissenting). Contrary to JUSTICE GORSUCH’s suggestion, see ante, at 3–7, that conventional method of interpretation will not always favor (or always disfavor) executive officials, given the variety of delegation schemes Congress adopts. I’ll let JUSTICE GORSUCH relitigate on his own our old debates about other statutes, unrelated to the one before us. What matters here is only that IEEPA’s delegation refutes the Executive’s assertion of authority to levy tariffs, without any help from the major-questions doctrine.

taxes. That text authorizes the President, upon finding a foreign threat and declaring an emergency, to “regulate” the “importation” of foreign goods. 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B). And the meaning of “regulate,” both in common parlance and as Congress uses the word, does not en-compass taxing. See ante, at 14–15. To “regulate,” according to the Government’s preferred definition, means to “fix, establish or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws.” Brief for Federal Parties 24 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979)). Nothing in that definition naturally refers to levying taxes. Nor does Congress ever use the word “regulate” in that way. Hundreds of provisions in the U. S. Code give agencies the authority to “regulate” one thing or another. Yet the Government cannot identify a single one that is understood to grant taxing power. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. When Congress wants to delegate that power, it uses a whole different vocabulary—terms like “duty,” “tariff,” or “surcharge,” which do not appear in IEEPA. See ante, at 8 (citing representative statutes); see also ante, at 19 (discussing, in particular, 19 U. S. C. §1862 (1970 ed.)). And likewise, when Congress means to cover both regulatory and taxing powers, it refers to each separately. See ante, at 15 (also citing statutes). Of course, Congress knows that taxes can be used for regulatory ends: They can be a means of controlling or adjusting behavior. But Congress still follows the path this Court long ago marked out, and the one most consonant with ordinary meaning, of treating the power to “regulate” trade as “entirely distinct” from the power to “levy taxes.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201–202 (1824); see ante, at 15. So in granting only the former, IEEPA excludes the latter: The President has the ability to regulate, but not to impose taxes on, imports.

The surrounding statutory language confirms the point. As the principal opinion explains, “regulate” is one of 9 verbs listed in IEEPA’s delegation provision. See ante, at 15. (The others are “investigate,” “block,” “direct,” “compel,” “nullify,” “void,” “prevent,” and “prohibit.” §1702(a)(1)(B).) Those verbs are followed by 11 objects, each describing a distinct sort of transaction involving foreign property—not just “importation,” but also “acquisition,” “use,” “transfer,” and so forth. Ibid. Combine the verbs and objects in all possible ways, and the statute authorizes 99 actions a President can take to address a foreign threat. And exactly none of the other 98 involves raising revenues. Rather, each en-ables the President to impose penalties, restrictions, or controls on foreign commerce. See ante, at 15. So when the phrase “regulate … importation” is invoked to impose quantity or quality limits on bringing foreign goods into the country—for example, by setting quotas or requiring quarantines—the phrase fits well with its 98 neighbors. Just like the rest, it provides a way to constrain or alter various foreign transactions. But when that phrase is invoked to impose tariffs? Then it becomes the odd man out—the only one of 99 permission slips to involve “the core congressional power of the purse.” Ante, at 8; see ante, at 5–6. So even if (contra both conventional and congressional usage) the word “regulate” might refer to taxation in some other (hitherto undiscovered) statutory context, it would not do so in IEEPA.2

Likewise, Congress’s consistent practice in delegating tariff power refutes the Government’s position. As the ——————

2 The legislative history of IEEPA offers yet more proof that Congress did not authorize taxation. The Senate Report, in its description of the statute, reduces the 99 authorized actions to the following: the power “to control or freeze property transactions where a foreign interest is involved.” S. Rep. No. 95–466, p. 5 (1977). The House Report similarly describes the delegation provision as “authoriz[ing] the President” to “regulate or freeze any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, p. 15 (1977). Neither of those descriptions at all suggests that Congress intended to cede its taxing power.

principal opinion details, Title 19 of the U. S. Code includes multiple provisions granting the President authority to levy tariffs. See ante, at 8–9. But in each and every instance, Congress has not only used specific language (e.g., “duty” or “surcharge”), see supra, at 4, but also imposed tight restraints on the power given. It has capped the tariff ’s rate (e.g., 15%); or limited the tariff ’s duration (e.g., 150 days); or established strict procedural conditions before the tariff can take effect (e.g., investigations, public hearings, and re-ports); or all of the above. See ante, at 8–9. What Congress has never done in a tariff provision is what the Government claims it did here—conferred power on the President to impose a tariff of any amount, for any time, on only his own say-so. And construing IEEPA to give that unparalleled authority would effectively erase all the carefully confined tariff provisions in Title 19. For any President could then escape the rigors of those laws—could put in place, say, a non-time-limited 100% tariff on all foreign products—by the simple expedient of identifying a foreign threat. That gutting of Title 19’s tariff scheme is not what Congress, when delegating power to “regulate” imports, could have meant to accomplish.

Nor has any President until now understood IEEPA to authorize imposing tariffs. Between 1977 (when IEEPA

was enacted) and 2024, eight Presidents had the chance to make use of IEEPA’s delegation of power. And all chose the same course. They invoked the statute’s “regulate importation” provision for a variety of non-tariff purposes. See ante, at 10. But they looked elsewhere—to Title 19’s provisions— for tariff authority. See ante, at 10–11. In other words, each President read the statutes as Congress wrote them, with IEEPA enabling him to regulate imports and Title 19 enabling him—in confined situations—to tax those foreign goods. None, as far as anyone has suggested, even considered doing otherwise.3

For all those reasons, straight-up statutory construction resolves this case for me; I need no major-questions thumb on the interpretive scales. IEEPA gives the President significant authority over transactions involving foreign property, including the importation of goods. But in that generous delegation, one power is conspicuously missing.

Nothing in IEEPA’s text, nor anything in its context, enables the President to unilaterally impose tariffs. And needless to say, without statutory authority, the President’s tariffs cannot stand. See ante, at 5–6.

——————

3 Presidents followed the same practice, with one quasi-exception, un-der IEEPA’s predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Beginning in 1941, TWEA authorized the President, as IEEPA does now, to “regulate … importation.” 12 U. S. C. §95a(1)(B) (1940 ed., Supp. I). During the next three decades, six Presidents used that delegation for only non-tariff ends, while relying on Title 19 to levy tariffs. In 1971, when President Nixon imposed tariffs in response to a balance-of-payments deficit, he continued in that tradition by invoking two statutes (the Tariff Act of 1930 and Trade Expansion Act of 1962) found in Title 19. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3 CFR 60 (1971–1975 Comp.). But in defending his act against a legal challenge, the Department of Justice argued that even if the two cited statutes did not authorize the tariffs, TWEA would do so. That after-the-fact claim of authority was upheld in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572, 577–578 (CCPA 1975); ante, at 17. The principal opinion well explains why that single lower court decision about TWEA has no bearing on IEEPA’s meaning. See ante, at 17–18, and n. 5.

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JACKSON, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

[Justice Jackson’s opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment is omitted. She agrees that IEEPA does not authorize the tariffs, and adds an argument from legislative history: the committee reports behind the 1941 and 1977 enactments show that “regulate … importation” was meant to let the President freeze and control foreign property, not to tax imports.]

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THOMAS, J., dissenting.

[Justice Thomas’s dissent is given in its opening and its Part III. Parts I and II, an originalist account of when the duty power may be delegated, are omitted for length]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.

I join JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’s principal dissent in full. As he explains, the Court’s decision today cannot be justified as a matter of statutory interpretation. Congress authorized the President to “regulate … importation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B). Throughout American history, the authority to “regulate importation” has been understood to include the authority to impose duties on imports. Post, at 9–13, 22–29 (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting). The meaning of that phrase was beyond doubt by the time that Congress enacted this statute, shortly after President Nixon’s highly publicized duties on imports were upheld based on identical language. Post, at 14–22. The statute that the President relied on therefore authorized him to impose the duties on imports 2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

at issue in these cases. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH makes clear that the Court errs in concluding otherwise.

I write separately to explain why the statute at issue here is consistent with the separation of powers as an original matter. The Constitution’s separation of powers forbids Congress from delegating core legislative power to the President. This principle, known as the nondelegation doctrine, is rooted in the Constitution’s Legislative Vesting Clause and Due Process Clause. Art. I, §1; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses forbid Congress from delegating core legislative power, which is the power to make substantive rules setting the conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Neither Clause prohibits Congress from delegating other kinds of power. Because the Constitution assigns Congress many powers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the President. Congress has done so repeatedly since the founding, with this Court’s blessing.

The power to impose duties on imports can be delegated.* At the founding, that power was regarded as one of many powers over foreign commerce that could be delegated to the President. Power over foreign commerce was not within the core legislative power, and engaging in foreign commerce was regarded as a privilege rather than a right. Early Congresses often delegated to the President power to regulate foreign commerce, including through duties on imports. As I suggested over a decade ago, the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to “a delegation of power to make rules governing private conduct in the area of foreign trade,” including rules imposing duties on imports. Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 80–81, n. 5 (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment). Therefore, to the extent that the Court relies on “ ‘separation of powers principles’ ” to rule against the President, ante, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), it is mistaken.

[* Justice Thomas’s footnote 1, on why he says “duties” rather than “tariffs” or “taxes,” is omitted.]

III

Congress’s delegation here was constitutional. The statute at issue in these cases, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, delegates to the President a wide range of powers over foreign commerce. IEEPA gives the President, on conditions satisfied here, the power to “regulate” foreign commerce, including “importation” of foreign property. 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B).

IEEPA’s delegation of power to impose duties on imports complies with the nondelegation doctrine. Congress delegated to the President a version of the same power that it has delegated to him in many statutes since the early days of the Republic. See supra, at 13–17. Congress limited that delegation to foreign commerce. See §1702(a)(1)(B); see also §1701. In delegating the power to impose duties on imports, it gave the President no core legislative power to make substantive rules setting the conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Its delegation therefore complied with the constitutional separation of powers and is consistent with centuries of practice and precedent. It did not need to exercise that power itself and did not need to delegate it “unambiguously”—even though, as JUSTICE ——————

authorized duties to new ports. Id., at 193. Although the Court’s reasoning was somewhat opaque, the Court upheld the executive officials’ unilateral peacetime duties in part because nobody has a right to “introduce foreign goods” except with the sovereign’s “expressed allowances.” Id., at 196–197.

7 In fact, less than a year ago, the Court explicitly rejected “a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legislation.” FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U. S. 656, 674 (2025).

KAVANAUGH explains, it did. See post, at 38–45 (dissenting opinion).

The principal opinion bases its decision on the major questions doctrine. Ante, at 7–13 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). In some cases, the Court has used the major questions doctrine as a canon of statutory interpretation because delegations of major powers are unlikely to be subtle. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U. S., at 468; see ante, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); see also Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 501–503 (2023). In other cases, the Court has used it to avoid what would have been originally understood as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022); ante, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). In today’s cases, neither the statutory text nor the Constitution provide a basis for ruling against the President. I respectfully dissent.

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KAVANAUGH, J., with whom THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., join, dissenting.

[Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent is the principal one and runs to nearly 20,000 words. The opening of his introduction, most of his Part IV (the nondelegation argument, with its reliance on Curtiss-Wright and Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence), and his Part V (the consequences) are given here. The balance of the introduction and Parts I through III, the detailed textual, historical and precedential argument, are omitted for length]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.

Acting pursuant to his statutory authority to “regulate … importation” under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, the President has imposed tariffs on imports of foreign goods from various countries. The tariffs have generated vigorous policy debates. Those policy debates are not for the Federal Judiciary to resolve. Rather, the Judiciary’s more limited role is to neutrally interpret and apply the law. The sole legal question here is whether, under IEEPA, tariffs are a means to “regulate … importation.” Statutory text, history, and precedent demonstrate that the answer is clearly yes: Like quotas and embargoes, tariffs are a traditional and common tool to regulate importation.

Since early in U. S. history, Congress has regularly authorized the President to impose tariffs on imports of foreign goods. Presidents have often used that authority to obtain leverage with foreign nations, help American manufacturers and workers compete on a more level

playing field, and generate revenue for the United States. Numerous laws such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of 1974 continue to authorize the President to place tariffs on foreign imports in a variety of circumstances, and Presidents have often done so. In recent years, Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and Biden have all imposed tariffs on foreign imports under those statutory authorities.

President Trump has similarly imposed tariffs, and has done so here under IEEPA. During declared national emergencies, IEEPA broadly authorizes the President to regulate international economic transactions. Most relevant for this case, during those national emergencies, IEEPA grants the President the power to “regulate … importation” of foreign goods.

In early 2025, President Trump declared two national emergencies pursuant to the National Emergencies Act. See 50 U. S. C. §1621(a). One emergency concerned drug trafficking into the United States. The other emergency involved trade imbalances with foreign nations that have harmed American manufacturers and workers.

To help address those emergencies, the President drew upon his authority in IEEPA to “regulate … importation,” and he imposed tariffs on imports from various countries. The plaintiffs argue and the Court concludes that the President lacks authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs. I disagree. In accord with Judge Taranto’s careful and persuasive opinion in the Federal Circuit, I would conclude that the President’s power under IEEPA to “regulate … importation” encompasses tariffs. As a matter of ordinary meaning, including dictionary definitions and historical usage, the broad power to “regulate … importation” includes the traditional and common means to do so—in particular, quotas, embargoes, and tariffs.

History and precedent confirm that conclusion. In 1971, President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs on almost all foreign imports. He levied the tariffs under IEEPA’s predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act, which similarly authorized the President to “regulate … importation.” The Nixon tariffs were upheld in court. Moreover, in 1976, a year before IEEPA was enacted, this Court unanimously ruled that a similarly worded statute authorizing the President to “adjust the imports” permitted President Ford to impose monetary exactions on foreign oil imports. See Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976) (Algonquin).

For both the Nixon tariffs and the Ford tariffs upheld by this Court in Algonquin, the relevant statutory provisions did not specifically refer to “tariffs” or “duties,” but instead more broadly authorized the President to “regulate … importation” or to “adjust the imports.” Therefore, when IEEPA was enacted in 1977 in the wake of the Nixon and Ford tariffs and the Algonquin decision, Congress and the public plainly would have understood that the power to “regulate … importation” included tariffs. If Congress wanted to exclude tariffs from IEEPA, it surely would not have enacted the same broad “regulate … importation” language that had just been used to justify major American tariffs on foreign imports.

Importantly, IEEPA’s authorization for the President to impose tariffs did not grant the President any new substantive power. Since the Founding, numerous statutes have authorized—and still do authorize—the President to impose tariffs and other foreign import restrictions. IEEPA merely allows the President to impose tariffs somewhat more efficiently to deal with foreign threats during national emergencies.

Context and common sense buttress that interpretation of IEEPA. The plaintiffs and the Court acknowledge that IEEPA authorizes the President to impose quotas or embargoes on foreign imports—meaning that a President could completely block some or all imports. But they say that IEEPA does not authorize the President to employ the lesser power of tariffs, which simply condition imports on a payment. As they interpret the statute, the President could, for example, block all imports from China but cannot order even a $1 tariff on goods imported from China. That approach does not make much sense. Properly read, IEEPA does not draw such an odd distinction between quotas and embargoes on the one hand and tariffs on the other. Rather, it empowers the President to regulate imports during national emergencies with the tools Presidents have traditionally and commonly used,

including quotas, embargoes, and tariffs.

The Court today nonetheless concludes otherwise and holds that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs to deal with the declared drug trafficking and trade deficit emergencies. But the Court’s decision is splintered. In today’s six-Justice majority, three Justices (JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE

IV

Finally, no Member of the Court today relies on the nondelegation doctrine. But the plaintiffs briefly raise such an argument, and I will therefore briefly address it. The ——————

24 What is the status going forward of the major questions doctrine in foreign affairs cases? Only three Justices (at most) today suggest that the major questions doctrine should apply in the foreign affairs context— THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE BARRETT. I doubt that the major questions doctrine analysis in THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion for those three Justices is controlling for future cases as a matter of precedent under the Marks rule. See Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977). That is because three Justices (JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON) do not recognize the major questions doctrine at all. Ante, at 1–2 (KAGAN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And this dissent would not apply it in the foreign affairs context. So it appears that six Justices would not apply it in the foreign affairs context. In my view, the question of whether or how the major questions doctrine applies in foreign affairs cases remains at least an open question.

argument is unavailing for many of the reasons already noted in the major questions analysis above. This Court has repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to congressional delegations to the President in the foreign affairs area, including delegations of tariff authority. For matters of foreign affairs and national security, the Court has traditionally recognized that Congress “must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it

customarily wields in domestic areas.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17 (1965). And to reiterate, numerous statutes “ ‘authorizing action by the President in respect of subjects affecting foreign relations’ ” “ ‘either leave the exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general than that which has always been

considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs.’ ” Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 80, n. 5 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 324 (1936)). Therefore, as JUSTICE THOMAS has explained, the Court’s precedents establish that “the Constitution grants the President a greater measure of discretion in the realm of foreign relations.” Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80, n. 5; see Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at 319– 322; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 422 (1935).

Justice Robert Jackson likewise noted the “ ‘unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the

President is to be governed.’ ” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 636, n. 2 (1952) (concurring opinion) (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 321–322). As such, the “strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power to the President over internal affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power in external affairs.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 636, n. 2 (concurring opinion).

[Omitted: Justice Kavanaugh’s survey of decisions upholding broad delegations to the President in foreign affairs and trade, from Field v. Clark and J. W. Hampton to Algonquin, and his example of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.]

In all events, for purposes of this Court’s nondelegation precedents, IEEPA sufficiently constrains the President’s authority to declare an emergency and impose tariffs. See J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409; FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U. S. 656, 673–675, 681–691 (2025). The President may exercise the authorities in IEEPA “only” “to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat” that “has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States” and “with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.” 50 U. S. C. §1701. Congress placed numerous limits on IEEPA, including a default 1-year time limit, an enumerated list of exceptions, and comprehensive congressional reporting requirements. See §§1622(d), 1702(b), 1703.

[The rest of Part IV, on how far the plaintiffs’ theory would reach into other tariff and national-security statutes, is omitted.]

V

The overarching theme of the Court’s opinion is that tariffs are not a clear means to “regulate … importation” and that Congress was therefore required to use the word “tariff,” “duty,” or the like in IEEPA in 1977 if it wanted to authorize tariffs on foreign imports. But that conclusion ——————

25 Some last points for completeness: The plaintiffs also raise two other arguments that the Court today does not address or rely on. First, they argue that Section 122, a non-emergency tariff statute that addresses trade deficits, implicitly displaces IEEPA’s tariff authority. Second, they argue that the tariffs here do not deal with an “unusual and extraordinary threat” as to which a national emergency has been declared. In my view, those arguments are insubstantial, as Judge Taranto persuasively explained in the Federal Circuit. See 149 F. 4th 1312, 1359–1361, 1371–1375 (2025) (dissenting opinion). Because the Court today does not address or rely on them, I will not discuss them further here. Finally, I agree with footnote 1 of the Court’s opinion regarding jurisdiction. Ante, at 5, n. 1.

contravenes text, history, and precedent. To summarize: Algonquin in 1976 unanimously held the opposite. The Nixon and Ford tariffs were based on statutory provisions that did not use the word “tariff ” or “duty.” There is a long tradition of Presidents imposing tariffs as a means of regulating importation and commerce. The predecessor Trading with the Enemy Act has long been understood to authorize tariffs during wartime as a means to “regulate … importation,” even though it does not use the word “tariff ” or “duty.” The history of the Polk, Lincoln, and McKinley tariffs shows that tariffs are a means of regulating importation. Marshall, Story, and Madison stated that tariffs are a means of regulating foreign commerce. The dictionary definitions and ordinary usage establish that tariffs are a means of regulating importation.

All of that and much more, in my view, overwhelmingly establish that IEEPA clearly authorizes the President to impose tariffs.

That said, with respect to tariffs in particular, the Court’s decision might not prevent Presidents from imposing most if not all of these same sorts of tariffs under other statutory authorities. For example, Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 permits the President to impose a “temporary import surcharge” to “deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits.” 19 U. S. C. §2132(a). Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides that, if the International Trade Commission determines an article is being imported in such quantities that it is “a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article,” the President may take “appropriate and feasible action,” including imposing a “duty.” §§2251(a), 2253(a)(3)(A). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President through a subordinate officer to “impose duties” if he determines that “an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country” is “unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce.” §§2411(a)– (c). Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 permits the President to impose tariffs when he finds that “any foreign country places any burden or disadvantage upon the commerce of the United States.” §1338(d). And Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes the

President to, after receiving a report from the Secretary of Commerce, “adjust the imports of [an] article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.” §1862(c)(1)(a).

So the Court’s decision is not likely to greatly restrict Presidential tariff authority going forward. But the Court’s decision is likely to generate other serious practical consequences in the near term. One issue will be refunds. Refunds of billions of dollars would have significant consequences for the U. S. Treasury. The Court says nothing today about whether, and if so how, the

Government should go about returning the billions of dollars that it has collected from importers. But that process is likely to be a “mess,” as was acknowledged at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 153–155. A second issue is the decision’s effect on the current trade deals. Because IEEPA tariffs have helped facilitate trade deals worth trillions of dollars—including with foreign nations from China to the United Kingdom to Japan, the Court’s decision could generate uncertainty regarding various trade agreements. That process, too, could be difficult.

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The tariffs at issue here may or may not be wise policy. But as a matter of text, history, and precedent, they are clearly lawful. I respectfully dissent.

Notes & Questions

1. Count the votes twice. Six Justices hold that IEEPA does not authorize these tariffs. Three hold that the major questions doctrine explains why. Work out what each of those two propositions is worth as precedent. If a future litigant cites this case for the major questions doctrine, what is the honest answer about its weight? And notice the structural oddity: Parts II–A–1 and II–B, which command six votes, would have decided the case on their own. Why did the Chief Justice write Part II–A–2 at all?

2. Kagan’s refusal. “[B]ecause I think the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation amply support today’s result, I do not join the part of that opinion invoking the so-called major-questions doctrine.” Take the “so-called” seriously. Her position is not that the President wins; it is that the doctrine is unnecessary, and that a canon invoked when it is unnecessary is a canon being built for later use. State the strongest case that she is right, and then the strongest case that a clear-statement rule is precisely what a delegation this large calls for. Compare Justice Barrett’s concurrence, which denies that the doctrine is a clear-statement rule at all and calls it ordinary textualism about how sensible people read delegations — and ask whether Barrett and Kagan actually disagree.

3. Two words, sixteen apart. The Government’s entire claim rests on “regulate” and “importation” in §1702(a)(1)(B). The Court’s answer is a list: nine verbs, none of them “tax,” and the statutory neighbours of “regulate” are things like “block,” “prohibit,” and “nullify,” not revenue measures. That is noscitur a sociis doing constitutional work. Ask whether an interpretive canon can bear that much weight — and then ask the question the other way, as Justice Kavanaugh does: if “regulate … importation” does not include conditioning entry on payment, what does a President do under IEEPA that is short of an embargo?

4. Youngstown, used twice. The plurality quotes Jackson’s concurrence for the proposition that “[e]mergency powers … tend to kindle emergencies” and that emergencies “afford a ready pretext for usurpation.” Justice Kavanaugh quotes the same concurrence to place the President in category one — acting pursuant to express congressional authorization, where his power is at its maximum. Both are fair readings of the text of Jackson’s opinion. Which is the better reading of its argument? And note what this exchange shows about Youngstown: a framework that both sides can occupy is a framework that decides nothing until you have answered the statutory question first.

5. The winner who lost. Learning Resources is vacated with instructions to dismiss, because exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of International Trade. The company got the legal rule it wanted and no judgment. Trace what that means practically — who, after this decision, is entitled to a refund of tariffs already paid, and in what forum? Then connect it to Module 8: a merits holding is worth what the remedial and jurisdictional architecture lets a plaintiff collect, and the two are decided by different bodies of law.

6. Where this sits in the module. Module 5 asks what the President may do without Congress and what Congress may hand him. Youngstown answers the first. The nondelegation cases and the major questions doctrine answer the second. This case is the first in which a majority has struck down a claimed delegation of this size, and it did so — for six Justices — by reading the statute rather than by invoking a doctrine. Ask whether that makes the major questions doctrine more secure or less.